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SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATIONS: THE SUPREME
COURT'S DUE PROCESS TEST FAILS TO
MEET ITS OWN CRITERIA
Steven P. Grossmant
There are perhaps few procedures in our system of criminaljustice more inexact than eyewitness identification of
criminal suspects. This is due in large measure to the
many subtle psychological influences that affect any person's ability to observe, retain, and recollect events, particularly when stress is present. The author discusses the
current constitutional standard for the admissibility of
eyewitness identificationsand examines whether this test
serves the interests it purports to uphold. After discussing the impact of psychological factors and suggestive
police practices, the author offers some guidelines for
more consistent application of the existing test.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since the United States Supreme Court announced in
Stovall v. Denno' that identification procedures conducted in
criminal cases could be violative of due process, courts have
wrestled with cases involving suggestive conduct in both corporeal and photographic identifications. In the most recent Supreme
Court cases involving due process challenges to identification testimony, the focus of concern has shifted from the suggestive behavior itself to the effect that this suggestiveness has upon the reliability of the identification.2 Thus, even if the police engage in
conduct that indicates to the witness that they believe a certain
suspect guilty, the court may nonetheless deem the identification
to be reliable after examining the totality of the circumstances. If3
deemed reliable, neither the out-of-court identification proceeding
nor the in-court identification4 will be beyond the proper inquiry of
the prosecutor.

t B.A., City College of New York, 1969; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1973; LL.M., New

1.
2.
3.
4.

York University School of Law, 1977; Assistant District Attorney, Bronx County,
New York, 1973-77; Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Lauren A. Greco.
388 U.S. 293 (1967).
See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977); Neff v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198-99 (1972).
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). Following the decision in Manson, most courts have used the same totality of circumstances approach to determine
the admissibility of both out-of-court and in-court identifications. N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS § 37, at 60-61 (Supp. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SOBEL].
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In a series of cases culminating with Manson v. Brathwaite,5
the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether an
identification proceeding violated a defendant's due process
rights. The Court articulated three societal interests it deemed relevant in fashioning a proper standard by which to evaluate the
constitutionality of suggestive identification evidence: (1) deterring improper police identification procedures; (2) furthering the
administration of justice; and (3) keeping unreliable evidence from
the jury's consideration.6 This article analyzes whether these societal interests are, in fact, well served by application of the totality
of circumstances test in its present form to eyewitness identifications. It then suggests measures that may be employed by courts
in order to serve these interests.
II. HISTORY
The Supreme Court first focused on the constitutional implications of eyewitness testimony in a trilogy of cases decided in
1967. Although United States v. Wade 7 relied on the sixth amendment in providing the right to counsel at pretrial identification
procedures, it contained within it a discussion of the effect certain
types of suggestive conduct can have on eyewitness identifications.8 Through Wade and Gilbert v. California,9 the Supreme
Court made clear that "critical stage" pretrial identifications
would be suppressed if the defendant was not afforded the right to
counsel at the display and that this suppression would occur regardless of whether suggestion contributed to the identification.1 0
The prosecution was still afforded the opportunity to obtain from
the witness a positive in-court identification of the defendant if it
could be demonstrated that this identification derived from a
source other than the uncounselled display."
On the same day that Wade and Gilbert were decided, the
Supreme Court held in Stovall that certain pretrial identification
procedures were "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" that they could constitute a
violation of due process.12 Unlike the right to counsel, the due

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Id at 111-13.
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Id at 228-35.
388 U.S. 263 (1967).
The Court subsequently held that the right to counsel does not attach until the defendant has been formally charged, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and that no
right to counsel exists at photographic identifications. United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973).
11. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 240 (1967).
12. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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process protection embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments attached regardless of when the challenged identification
proceeding occurred. 3 The victim in Stovall had been stabbed
eleven times by the same man who had murdered her husband and
at the time of the identification was hospitalized and believed near
death. 4 Due to the need to establish immediately whether in fact
Stovall was the assailant, the Court, looking to "the totality of the
circumstances," upheld the admission of the pretrial confrontation.' 5 Although viewing with disfavor one-on-one confrontations,
the Court ruled that the totality of the circumstances could, as
here, justify such suggestive procedures. 16 Unfortunately, the
Court in Stovail never defined "totality of the circumstances" nor
explained to what circumstances the concept would be limited.
Clearly those circumstances governing the identification proceeding itself would be germane, but what of those factors which relate
to the ability of the witness to see his assailant at the time of the
commission of the-crime? If factors outside the identification proceeding are relevant, some commentators have argued, due process becomes a concept primarily concerned with accuracy rather
than fairness.' 7
One year after its decision in Stoval, the Supreme Court
added to its definition of what constitutes a due process violation.
In Simmons v. United States,' the Court held that, with respect

to photographic identifications, "only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a very substantiallikelihood of irreparable misidentification,"19

would an in-court identification be prohibited. In determining the
likelihood of misidentification, the Court included an evaluation of
the opportunity the witness had to observe the criminal during
the commission of the crime.20 Although the Supreme Court in
Stovall never directly referred to due process factors external to
the identification proceeding itself, the Court in Simmons construed the witness' observation of the criminal act to be part of
the totality of the circumstances. As the evidence challenged in
Simmons was the in-court identification only, it was not yet clear
whether such external factors would be considered when the evi-

13. Stovall himself could claim no sixth amendment violation as the Court held Wade and
Gilbert not to be retroactive. Id. at 300.
14. Id. at 302.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. SOBEL, supra note 4, § 37 at 66 (1972); Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court
Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097,
1112-13 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pulaski].
18. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
19. Id. at 384 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 385.
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dence at issue was the pretrial identification proceeding. The subsequent Supreme Court opinions in Foster v. California21 and Coleman v. Alabama,2 2 although involving due process challenges to
eyewitness identifications, left this issue unresolved.23
With its decision in Neil v. Biggers, 24 the Supreme Court addressed directly the question of whether factors pertaining to a
witness' perception of the perpetrator at the time of the crime
could play a role in determining the admissibility of evidence concerning a pretrial identification proceeding. In Biggers, the Court
deemed admissible the testimony of a rape victim relating to a
one-on-one corporeal identification conducted seven months after
the commission of the crime. Whereas Stovall held that the presence of improper suggestion does not automatically result in suppression of evidence relating to a pretrial identification display,
Biggers concluded that even unnecessary suggestion does not
compel exclusion of such evidence. 25 The Supreme Court reasoned
in Biggers that it is the unreliability that may stem from suggestive procedures and not the procedures themselves that violates
due process. To determine whether an eyewitness identification
was reliable, the Court looked to
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the
time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal,
the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the 26length of time between the crime
and the confrontation.
Clearly, factors quite apart from the conduct of the pretrial identification proceeding would hereafter play a role in determining the
admissibility of evidence pertaining to the identification confrontation itself.
In apparently finding some significance to the fact that the
confrontation in Biggers occurred before the holding in Stovall,
the Court seemed to leave open the question of whether the Biggers reliability factors were applicable to identification proceed-

21. 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
22. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
23. In Foster, the only Supreme Court case in which a due process challenge to identification testimony was successful, the Court held that the suggestive elements present in
the lineup and subsequent one-on-one confrontation were so egregious that the reliability of the identification was undermined. 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). Although referring to reliability, the Court never discussed any factors relating to the witness' original observation of the criminal. Coleman, like Simmons, concerned the prosecution's
use at trial of evidence relating to the in-court identification only.
24. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
25. IM. at 199.
26. Id.

19811

Suggestive Identifications

ings taking place after the decision in Stovall or whether a strict
2 7
per se exclusion of suggestive identifications should be applied.
With its holding in Manson v. Brathwaite,5 the Supreme Court
left no doubt that post-Stovail due process challenges to eyewitness testimony also would be decided by the totality of circumstances test and that this test included all of the reliability factors
articulated in Biggers.
In Manson, the Court was confronted with the admission of
testimony concerning the identification by a police officer of the
one photograph left on his desk for the officer to view. Conceding
that Biggers left some question as to whether its formulation of a
totality of circumstances test was applicable to post-Stovall identification proceedings, as opposed to a more strict test, the
Supreme Court examined the effectiveness of the two competing
due process approaches to identification testimony. The first of
these approaches, the per se test, mandates the automatic suppression of any evidence concerning an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure. The other, more lenient approach is the
totality of circumstances test, essentially as outlined in Biggers,
which focuses on the reliability of the identification and not
merely the suggestion employed in the identification confrontation. 0 In making a choice between these approaches, the Court
compared the two to determine which test would better satisfy the
societal interests behind judicial exclusion of eyewitness testimony. Concluding that the totality approach served society better, the Court in Manson applied the Biggers reliability factors.3 1
Reasoning that the officer witness had ample opportunity to view
the criminal, paid scrupulous attention to him at the time of the
crime, submitted an accurate description, was certain as to his
identification, that the time between the crime and the confrontation was only two days, and that there was no pressure upon the
witness to make an32 identification, the Court found the eyewitness'
testimony reliable.

27. In discussing the deterrent effect of a rule barring all testimony concerning suggestive pretrial identifications, the Court in Biggers wrote, "[Sluch a rule would have no
place in the present case, since both the confrontation and the trial preceded Stovall
v. Denno, when we first gave notice that the suggestiveness of confrontation procedures was anything other than a matter to be argued to the jury." 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972) (citation omitted). Thus, by implication, once Stovall served such notice, there
may be a place for such a strict rule.
28. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
29. Id at 109.
30. Id. at 110.
31. Id. at 114. The Manson Court added to the Biggers process the requirement of weighing the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification against the reliability
factors. Id
32. Id at 114-16.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 11

Thus, the crucial task for courts after Manson is to weigh the
impact that a particular suggestive police practice has upon the
reliability of the identification made by the witness. Although the
Supreme Court offers some guidance as to what factors should be
considered in evaluating the reliability of an identification, neither
Biggers nor Manson provide criteria for determining the degree of
suggestion present in particular identification proceedings. This
omission is particularly glaring in Manson, since the Supreme
Court there, after adopting the Biggers reliability factors, declared, "Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself."3 3 As a result of the
Supreme Court's failure to articulate what constitutes suggestion
and, equally important in a balancing process, what particular
suggestive practices are worse than others, lower courts tend to
regard suggestion as devoid of gradations. Thus, in measuring
specific factors of reliability against an amorphous, unstratified
concept of suggestion, many courts have suppressed only the
most egregious identification displays and even these are often
condoned when the witness is deemed3 to
have substantially satis4
fied the reliability criteria of Biggers.
III. DETERRENCE OF IMPROPER POLICE PROCEDURES
Of the three societal interests to be considered in fashioning a
due process standard for the admission of identification evidence,
only with respect to the issue of deterrence did the Supreme Court
find the per se approach to be superior to the totality of circumstances test. Despite this concession, the Court nevertheless
maintained that the continued possibility of judicial suppression
would serve as an adequate deterrent to unnecessarily suggestive
police identification procedures. 35 Reaffirming what it held in Biggers, the Court in Manson ruled that due process is violated not
by unnecessary suggestion alone but by suggestive practices that
lead to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. 6 Clearly,
then, it is the reliability or accuracy of the identification and not
the conduct of the police that ultimately determines whether identification evidence will be excluded.
In assessing reliability, courts look to the Biggers factors, the
first of which is the opportunity of the witness to observe his assailant during the commission of the crime. 7 This opportunity to
observe is completely beyond the control of the police. The other
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 114.
See cases cited note 47 infra.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
Id. at 116.
See United States v. Poe, 462 F.2d 195, 198 (5th Cir. 1972) (opportunity to observe is
prime among the Biggers factors).
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Biggers reliability factors of certainty of the identification, attention paid to the assailant during the crime, accuracy of the witness' description, and to a certain extent the time period between
the crime and the display 3s are also independent of any police conduct. Therefore, focusing on reliability as the "linchpin" upon
which the admissibility of identification testimony hinges communicates to the police that factors beyond their control can result in
the proper introduction into evidence of suggestive identification
proceedings. Continuing this reasoning, even intentional or flagrant suggestive conduct might produce no negative consequences for the police under the totality of circumstances approach.39 In sum, a reasonable police officer could read Manson as
conveying the message that when external factors of reliability
are present, courts will tolerate some affirmative suggestive conduct. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
leaves little doubt as to what it perceives Manson's impact to be
on the deterrence of improper police behavior:
To be sure, deterrence of improper police conduct is a
worthy goal. But when improper police conduct, directed
only at a witness, does not taint the reliability of that witness' identification evidence, the defendant has nothing
of which to complain. Probative evidence should not be
kept from a jury at the behest of a defendant whose rights
are unaffected by the police conduct. The Supreme Court
has determined that deterrence of such improper conduct
may be fully effectuated by appellate review that focuses
on the reliability of identification evidence. Thus we need
not consider the reprehensibility of police conduct in
upon the reliability of the
these cases except as it bears
40
identification.
challenged
The uniformly condemned procedures of displaying a suspect
standing alone to a witness, commonly called a show-up, 41 and the
38. While the police arrange the display, when they do so depends often on the existence
of other evidence allowing them to focus their investigation upon one of several
suspects.
39. See Pulaski, supra note 17, at 1114. In commenting on the totality test, the author
stated:
Because it considers such external factors as the witness' initial opportunity
to observe the offender and because it requires defendants to demonstrate a
substantial likelihood of prejudice at trial, the permissive due process test
provides no real incentive to the police to avoid suggestive procedures. On
the contrary, it provides a means by which the prosecution may successfully
introduce at trial identification evidence obtained as the result of grossly
unfair pretrial proceedings.
Id.
40. United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
41. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). See also Gonzalez v. Hammock, 477 F.
Supp. 730, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[Ilts use [a showup], especially in a police station
when less suggestive methods are available, has generally been condemned as the
least reliable form of eyewitness identification.").
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non-corporeal equivalent of showing the witness only one photograph 42 are flourishing under the totality of circumstances approach. 43 Rather than deterring such conduct, the effect of Biggers and Manson has been to provide the police with a fairly clear
signal that absent extremely aggravating circumstances, the oneon-one presentation of suspects to witnesses will result in no suppression.4 4 The use, therefore, of the preferable techniques of the
lineup or photographic array is left to the discretion of the investiofficer, and their use can almost be considered a gragating police
45
tuitous act.
Both state and federal appellate courts have shown, for the
most part, little reluctance to follow the Supreme Court's lead in
countenancing admittedly suggestive police procedures.46 Even
where police tactics involve flagrant misconduct that focuses the
attention of the witness squarely on the suspect, courts have

42. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S.
377, 383 (1968); Hudson v. Blackburn, 601 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1979); Bloodworth
v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382, 1383 (5th Cir. 1976).
43. SOBEL, supra note 4, §§ 37, 46; Pulaski, supra note 17, at 1119-20.
44. See S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 546 (1980). As this author
explained:
There is considerable evidence that law enforcement officers are correctly reading the signals that are emitted from the Supreme Court and generally echoed by lower courts. Those signals are that few identification procedures will be struck down by the judges and that the judges will strain to
keep government's "costs" associated with a bad lineup as low as possible.
Id See also SOBEL, supra note 4, § 37 at 61-62.
45. See State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. 214, 385 A.2d 831 (1978). In commenting on the effect
of the totality of the circumstances test, the court noted: "All things considered, the
consequences of misidentification are so great and the risks so high that it is questionable if a totality of circumstances test provides either a sufficient deterrent
against the unnecessary use of one-man showups or a sufficient protection against
misidentifications which may result therefrom." Id. at 218, 385 A.2d at 833.
46. See, e.g., Hudson v. Blackburn, 601 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1979) (six months after robbery-murder, witness shown two pictures of defendant alone on eve of trial); United
States ex rel. Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1974) (defendant, the only person in lineup wearing three-quarter length black leather coat fitting description of
coat worn by robber, identified by two victims viewing lineup together); United
States ex rel Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1974) (after selecting a different man
as robber, witness "corrects" herself and identifies defendant when shown his photograph alone); In re L.W., 390 A.2d 435 (D.C. 1978) (defendant substantially shorter
and younger than other lineup participants); Clempson v. State, 144 Ga. App. 625,
241 S.E.2d 495 (1978) (five alleged robbers standing together, illuminated by headlights of police car, identified by witness sitting in rear of car); State v. Lee, 340 So.
2d 1339 (La. 1976) (twenty minutes after robbery-assault, bringing back suspects and
saying "we think we caught them"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977); State v. Heald,
120 N.H. 319, 414 A.2d 1288 (1980) (witness described suspect as a man 40-45 years
of age; defendant's photograph was the only one in the array of a man in his forties).
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found elements of reliability present sufficient to uphold the use of
challenged eyewitness testimony. 47 One such case is a 1978 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, State v. St. Onge.41
The victim in St. Onge was robbed by a man holding a rifle
and wearing a bandana across his face. The description of the assailant given to the police by the victim was of a "teenager, 5 '6"5'10" tall, very heavyset, having dark hair and dark eyes, and who
spoke with a soft, or low, stuttering voice. ' 49 One or two days
after the crime, the victim was shown a "mug shot" photograph of
the defendant with a card held over the nose and mouth of the face
in the picture and informed "that the subject of the photograph
had previously been imprisoned on burglary charges, had a speech
impediment and was a good suspect.' 50 The victim indicated that
there was physical similarity between the defendant and the perpetrator, but without an opportunity to hear the defendant's
voice, he could not be certain that the two were the same man. 51
Later that same week, the victim was brought to the sheriff's office and told he would be hearing, from behind a partition, the
voice of the man whose picture he had previously seen. Upon hearing the defendant's voice and observing the defendant after he
emerged from behind the partition, the victim made an identifica52
tion.
After condemning the suggestive techniques employed by the
police both in the photographic identification accompanied by the
objectionable comments and in the subsequent voice identification, the court in St. Onge looked to the necessity of using these
procedures. 5 3 The court concluded that there was in fact no need to
show the victim only one picture nor any reason to limit the number of voices heard to just one.54 Examining next the presence of
the reliability factors listed in Biggers, the court found the inci-

47. See, e.g., Frank v. Blackburn, 605 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1979); Washington v. Cupp, 586
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1978); Landry v. Alabama, 579 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1978); People v.
Dortch, 64 Ill. App. 3d 894, 381 N.E.2d 1193 (1978) (witness, who was aware of the
name of the perpetrator, shown photo of defendant with his name written on photograph); State v. Washington, 257 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1977) (defendant brought before
witness by police officer; at the time, defendant was carrying purple jacket over his
arm matching the description of coat worn by perpetrator), cert denied, 435 U.S.
1008 (1978); State v. Dickerson, 568 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1978) (one hour after his car was
forcibly stolen, witness asked to identify defendant after being told defendant was
found in his car and seeing defendant alone handcuffed in jail cell).
48. 392 A.2d 47 (Me. 1978).
49. Id at 49.
50. Id at 50.
51. Id
52. Id
53. Id at 50-51. In Stovall v. Denno, the Supreme Court ruled that the necessity to
obtain an immediate identification could serve as justification for the police officer's
use of suggestive identification procedures. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
54. 392 A.2d 47, 51 (Me. 1978).
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dent entailed a two-to-three minute observation, under minimal
light, of a man who was wearing a mask. Still, the court added, the
witness was able to describe the assailant as short, stout, and possessing a distinctive speech impediment. The reluctance of the
witness to make an identification both at the photographic showing and later at the in-person confrontation indicated to the court
that the identification was free of suggestion." The court drew
this conclusion notwithstanding its concession that uncertainty is
one of the criteria enunciated in Biggers indicative of a lack of reliability in the identification.56 The court gave credit to the witness'
description despite its generality and the fact that the defendant,
rather than being a teenager, was thirty-three years old. Weighing
the admittedly and expressly disapproved suggestive police confrontation against the factors of reliability, the court, although acknowledging this to be a "close case," found no error in the admission of testimony relating to both the pretrial and in-court identifications. 7
It is reasonable to question the deterrent value of any due
process approach permitting the use of such overt police actions
that focus the attention of the witness so clearly upon one suspect. Additionally, the reliability deemed by the court sufficient to
overcome such blatant suggestion is far from convincing. The
only factor of any import in establishing the identity of the assailant was his distinctive voice impediment, but the manner in which
that voice impediment was identified as belonging to the defendant was so replete with suggestion as to be virtually valueless.
The witness in St. Onge identified the one voice presented to him
after being informed that it belonged to the person whose photograph he had tentatively identified following grossly incriminating police comments. Although apparently feeling somewhat constrained by Manson, the court in St. Onge was not unaware of the
extremely limited degree of deterrence of improper police behavior
that results from the totality of circumstances approach: "[W]e
have hitherto been reluctant to hold that a particular kind of
pretrial identification procedure is per se impermissibly suggestive. Nevertheless, should unnecessarily suggestive identification

55. Id
56. Id at 51 n.3.
57. Id at 52.
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procedures continue, we may be required to reassess our current
position."58
IV. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The societal interest that argues most strongly for adoption
of the totality of circumstances approach, according to the
Supreme Court, is the furtherance of the administration of
justice. 9 Among the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court,
with regard to the effect of the competing per se approach upon
the administration of justice, is the possibility of the guilty going
free, the likelihood of error by the trial judge due to the inflexibility of per se exclusion, and the "Draconian sanction" whereby the
admission of reliable but suggestive identification evidence would
result in reversal. 60 Equally relevant, although unmentioned by
the Court, should be the somewhat converse considerations of the
extent to which eyewitness identifications involve the possibility
of the innocent being convicted and the likelihood of condoning
the use of evidence that subjects the finding of truth to the vast
discretion judges retain under the totality approach.
That the Court regards the furtherance of justice as one of
those interests which must be considered in choosing between the
two competing due process approaches is most appropriate. Analysis of how effectively the totality test furthers this interest, however, should be extended beyond the particular factors noted by
the Court. Does the flexibility allowed under the totality approach
result in the admission of evidence that contributes to the conviction of possibly innocent defendants? What is the impact of eyewitness testimony upon jurors and are jurors able to discern the
effect of suggestion upon such testimony?6 1 Is use of the totality

58. Id. at 52 n.4 (citations omitted). See also People v. Adams, 70 A.D.2d 825, 417
N.Y.S.2d 868 (1979). In his concurring opinion in Adams, Justice Sandier made the
following observation about the Manson decision: "What troubles me here is an
increasing sense that the identification procedures disclosed may reflect a developing
tendency, following relaxation of the more rigorous standards previously advanced
by the Supreme Court, to lapse back into precisely the kind of objectionable methods
that contributed to the earlier more severe approach." Id at 826,417 N.Y.S.2d at 869
(Sandier, J., concurring). Similarly, in State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. 214, 385 A.2d 831
(1978), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire warned: "Although we do not adopt a
per se rule at this time, continued use of unnecessarily suggestive police procedures
will cause us to do so, by demonstrating the inadequacies of the deterrent effect of
the totality of circumstances rule." Id at 219, 385 A.2d at 833-34.
59. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
60. Id. at 113.
61. In Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 394 U.S.
964 (1969), cited with approval in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.14 (1977),
the court asserted that cross-examination and summation are adequate vehicles for
communicating to a jury the effect of suggestion upon accuracy. 408 F.2d at 1251.
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of circumstances approach likely to result in the promulgation of
rules by police departments or legislatures designed to insure fair
and unbiased identification procedures? Each of these questions
should be addressed before a conclusion is drawn as to whether
the due process approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Manson furthers the administration of justice.
In addressing those issues which relate to the furtherance of
justice, the difference between the purposes behind the use of the
exclusionary rule for identification testimony and its use in con62
junction with fourth amendment violations must be understood.
When physical evidence is excluded because the governmental action in seizing it involved a violation of the fourth amendment,
probative and reliable evidence is kept from the jury. Courts have
indicated that suppressing illegally seized evidence serves to deter the police from engaging in conduct violative of the fourth
amendment and ensures that the judicial process will not be
tainted by the use of improperly obtained evidence.6 3 Although
both the deterrent and the judicial integrity purposes of the exclusionary rule also would be applicable to the exclusion of suggestive identification evidence, something more fundamental to the
administration of justice is involved in determining the admissibility of eyewitness evidence.
Identification evidence that violates due process is suppressed because the unnecessarily suggestive governmental actions are conducive to mistaken identification.6 4 Physical evidence, on the other hand, is suppressed for reasons having nothing to do with its intrinsic reliability.6 5 Therefore, an incorrect decision to admit into evidence impermissibly seized physical items,
while violative of a suspect's constitutional rights, in no way affords the jury the opportunity to use evidence of dubious accuracy
in convicting the defendant. Heroin seized from the defendant in
violation of the fourth amendment is still heroin that was illegally
possessed. Judicial error in permitting the admission of identifica62. The Court in Manson noted: "Unlike a warrantless search, a suggestive preindictment procedure does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest.
Thus, considerations urging the exclusion of evidence deriving from a constitutional
violation do not bear on the instant problem." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
112-13 n.13. While this argues for the proposition that police impropriety in due
process identification cases does not, as in fourth amendment cases, by itself require
suppression, it in no way touches upon whether the administration of justice is furthered by excluding evidence judicially determined to be suggestive but reliable.
63. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (suggests that the imperative of judicial
integrity has a minimal role as a justification for the exclusionary rule).
64. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-07 (1967).
65. The use of the word "reliable" to refer both to physical evidence and eyewitness identification should not disguise the fact that the "reliability" of an eyewitness identification depends upon a judicial determination. The "reliability" of physical evidence,
however, reflects the inherent characteristics of the evidence itself.
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tion evidence that violates due process, however, allows the jury
to use evidence against the defendant that may result directly in a
mistake in the truth-finding process. 6 6 Therefore, a high degree of
scrutiny should be exercised in the decision to admit into evidence
identification testimony challenged as violative of the defendant's
due process rights. Where a possible error relates directly to the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence, the administration of justice should tolerate no less.
Observers of the American system of criminal trials have long
been aware of the danger of wrongful convictions because of a witness' misidentification. 67 Edward Borchard, in his 1932 book, Convicting the Innocent, detailed numerous cases of people, later
shown to be innocent, being tried and convicted of crimes. After
analyzing the causes of these mistaken convictions, Borchard concluded that misidentifications by victims were the prime cause of
wrongful convictions.68 Judge Jerome Frank, some years later, undertook a similar investigation and arrived at the same conclusion. 69 Although the possibility of erroneous convictions cannot be
prevented, nothing is more fundamental to our system of justice
than the need to minimize these tragedies.70
To bridge the analytical gap between the misidentification of
the defendant by an eyewitness and the ultimate conviction of
that defendant by a jury, the impact of identification testimony
upon juries must be examined. 1 One commentator asserts that
"juries are unduly receptive to identification evidence and are not
sufficiently aware of its dangers. ' 72 In fact, it has been argued

66. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 127 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. See E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT at xiii(1932) [hereinafter cited as
BORCHARDI. See also United States v, Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); F. FRANKFURTER,
THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZEI21 30 (1927), cited in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
at 228.
68. BORCHARD, supra note 67, at xiii.
69. J. FRANK & B. FRANK, NOT GUILTY 61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FRANK & FRANK].

70. See United States v. Green, 538 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court in Green
quoted Blackstone's immortal phrase, "[B]etter ten guilty persons should go free
than one innocent person be convicted." Id
71. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977). The Manson Court stated that it
had faith in the jury's ability to weigh properly evidence with some elements of
untrustworthiness. Id
72. P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 19 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as WALL).
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ofthat juries are apt to rely more on evidence of identification
7
fered by an eyewitness than on any other form of evidence. 1
In order to determine the amount of influence eyewitness testimony has upon jury verdicts, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus conducted an experiment using 150 subjects as jurors. 74 Loftus presented her jurors with facts concerning the robbery of a grocer in
which $110 was taken by a man who then fired two gunshots, killing the grocer. Evidence presented by the prosecution showed the
defendant was arrested in his apartment two and one half hours
after the crime. His apartment was located in the building into
which the robber was seen to have run after the murder, and in the
defendant's room the police found $123 and a pair of shoes containing traces of the same type of ammonia used to clean the victimized grocery store.75 From the defense the jurors learned that,
in taking the witness stand, the defendant testified that he had accumulated the money seized from his room over the two months
prior to his arrest and that the ammonia found in his shoes could
have come from a variety of places he frequented in his job as a delivery man. The jurors were then divided into three groups of fifty,
and the first group was asked to decide whether they believed the
defendant to be guilty based on this evidence. The results showed
76
that only eighteen percent of this group voted for conviction.
The second group of fifty jurors, in addition to the aforementioned evidence, was informed that a store clerk present at the
time of the crime testified to having observed the defendant commit the robbery-murder. With this one added variable of a single
eyewitness identification, seventy-two percent of the jurors in the
second group of fifty voted to convict the defendant. 77 It is unclear

73. See Eisenberg & Feustel, PretrialIdentification:An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 659, 659 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eisenberg &
Feustel]. As these authors noted:
Few pieces of evidence are as meaningful to the average jury as is the
identification of the criminal defendant by a witness to the crime. No matter
how strong the circumstantial evidence, the statement by the witness that
"he is the man" is quite often the most significant evidence to the lay person.
Even when a strong alibi case is presented, or when the circumstantial evidence points to the innocence of the accused, the identification of the defendant by a witness to the crime is sufficient evidence to convict.
Id. See also BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 103; Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465, 465 (1978). In commenting on the mistaken
conviction of one Everett Howell, Borchard observed: "Again a jury lent greater
weight to the identifications of the overwrought victims and witnesses of a crime of
violence than to the testimony of sober-minded and disinterested persons who positively saw the accused at other places and thus established a perfect alibi." BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 103.
74. E. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9-10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LOFTUS].
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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precisely how the eyewitness testimony was presented to the
jurors or whether they were instructed as to the legal principles
upon which a jury bases its verdict. The result, however, points to
the significant impact eyewitness testimony has upon juries.
Somewhat more alarming was the result Loftus obtained from
the final group of fifty jurors when she continued the experiment.
This last group had the benefit of testimony elicited by the defense attorney during cross-examination of the eyewitness. The
jurors were informed that during cross-examination, the eyewitness admitted to not wearing the eyeglasses he needs to properly
correct his vision of somewhat poorer than 20/400. Further, in response to a question from the defense attorney, the eyewitness
conceded that from where he stood in the grocery store, he was unable to see the face of the gunman. Despite this impeachment evidence, sixty-eight percent of the subject-jurors in the final group
believed the defendant to be guilty. 78 Thus, the responses partially
discrediting the eyewitness testimony resulted in only two fewer
jurors voting for conviction. Crediting arguendo the methodology
of the experiment, the obvious implication derived from Loftus'
efforts is that even impaired eyewitness testimony has a significant impact upon a jury's verdict.
The fact that the Manson Court limited its discussion of what
issues affect the administration of justice is particularly unfortunate because the Court seemed to attach profound significance to
the differences between the totality and per se approaches in furthering the administration of justice: Whereas "the per se approach has the more significant deterrent effect" and "both approaches.., are responsive to [the] concern" of keeping unreliable
identification evidence from the jury, only in the area of the
administration of justice does "the per se approach suffer serious
drawbacks" when compared to the totality of circumstances
test.79 Such a conclusion by the Court is unwarranted without a
more complete analysis of those additional issues which have an
impact on the furtherance of justice.
The Supreme Court in Manson lamented the likelihood of
error by the trial judge due to the inflexibility of the per se approach.8 0 Certainly the Court was correct in suggesting that the
more lenient totality approach affords courts and prosecutors
greater opportunity to preserve the convictions of guilty parties
identified in suggestive procedures. Furthermore, the per se rule,
as the Court maintained, is inflexible in depriving the government

78. Id
79. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
80. Id
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of the use of testimony concerning a suggestive identification proceeding."' What the Court failed to discuss, however, is the effect
of the more flexible totality approach upon the police and the judiciary. The Court might have inquired whether the administration
of justice is actually furthered by providing the police with significantly more discretion in the manner in which they display sus82
pects to witnesses, a logical outgrowth of the totality approach.
In addressing this question, it should be understood that no form
of police identification procedure, regardless of how flagrantly
suggestive, is expressly prohibited by the totality test. 3 The presence of all or some of the reliability factors outlined in Biggers can

81. It should be noted that even the per se rule permits the prosecutor to obtain an incourt identification from the witness if it can be shown that this identification stems
from an independent basis, that is, the witness' perception of the criminal incident
and not the tainted identification proceeding. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Manson, interpreted Simmons as adopting this independent basis test for in-court identification only. Marshall argued that Simmons was limited to testimony concerning an
in-court identification and, therefore, was not inconsistent with his interpretation of
Stoval that the admission of evidence concerning the pretrial identification proceeding should be evaluated solely on the issues of suggestiveness and necessity. Id. at
121-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Commentators have argued that the application of the independent basis test to
fifth and fourteenth amendment due process suggestivity cases does not afford sufficient protection to suspects even when the prosecutor's use of the test is limited to
just the in-court identification. For a discussion of this point, see Note, Mandatory
Exclusion of Identifications Resulting from Suggestive Confrontations: A Conceptual Alternative to the Independent Basis Test 53 B.U. L. REV. 433 (1973); Note, PreTrialIdentificationProcedures-Wadeto Gilbert to Stovall: Lower CourtsBobble the
Ball 55 MINN. L. REV. 779 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Pre-TrialIdentificationProcedures].
82. See Grano, Kirby, Biggers, And Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain
Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 717, 780 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Grano]. This author asserts that the totality approach, in permitting broad police discretion as to how an identification proceeding is conducted,
affords the innocent little protection from being the victim of impermissible suggestion. Id.
83. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1979). In Campbell the defendant
was forced to come to a preliminary hearing handcuffed and attired in prison garb.
Id. at 361. The first presiding justice of the peace suspended the identification at this
proceeding, stating that, in light of the defendant's attire, the hearing was a farce.
The hearing was later reconvened with a different justice of the peace presiding. Id.
at 361-62. The defendant was identified as the assailant and subsequently convicted.
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the conviction and stated that notwithstanding any impropriety, the prosecutor still should have had an opportunity to
demonstrate reliability. Id. at 366. See also cases cited note 46 supra.
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serve to overcome even the most improper identification displays.84 Police officers, charged with the responsibility of solving
crime, are not the proper repository for the vast discretion afforded under the totality approach. It is unreasonable to expect
the police, often acting under extreme public pressure to make an
of identification when surer
arrest, to utilize preferable methods
85
and easier ones are condoned.
In fashioning this admittedly flexible due process standard,
leaving much open to judicial interpretation of police actions, the
Supreme Court might have chosen also to examine the impact the
totality approach would have upon courts charged with applying
it. Had the Court analyzed this issue, the words of one commentator, written after Wade and Stovall but before adoption of the
even more flexible Biggers and Manson approaches, might have
proved helpful:
Lower courts, . . . in the application of Stovall except in
outrageous situations, have failed to find a violation of
due process. Every method of avoidance has been used by
the lower courts. In a substantial majority of cases, the
courts have found that the confrontation was not "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" as to be a violation of due process. If
the confrontation was tainted, the courts have easily
found an independent source for an in-court identification
of the suspect or in the court's opinion any error in the admission of the in-court identification was harmless ....
Thus courts have placed their imprimatur upon
highly questionable pretrial identifications. The continued case-by-case determination by the courts will do little
to remove unnecessary suggestibility in pretrial identifications. If pretrial identification procedures free from unnecessary suggestion are eventually to be achieved, other
8 6
methods will have to be developed.
The reasons for this tendency of the lower courts to approve the
admission of identification evidence derived from questionable
procedures is open to speculation.8 7 It has been asserted, for exam84. See Grano, supra note 82, at 747. Commenting on the "substantial likelihood of misidentification" standard used in the totality test, Grano points out that "under this
rule ... , the defendant is not protected against substantial suggestion that does not
quite amount to a due process violation." Id See also Eisenberg & Feustel, supra
note 73, at 680.
85. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967).
86. Pre-TrialIdentificationProcedures,supra note 81, at 818-19.
87. One commentator suggests that, with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
facts in Biggersas a guide, judges may conclude that construing the facts concerning
identification proceedings for the prosecution involves significantly less likelihood of
being reversed on appeal than does a finding for the defendant. Pulaski, supra note
17, at 1119.
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ple, that significant psychological pressure exists, due to a variety
of factors, for lower appellate courts to preserve convictions where
possible.8 Regardless of the reasons, however, the Supreme Court
in Manson, in the interest of furthering the administration of justice, should have discussed whether in fact trial and appellate
courts are inordinately hesitant to apply the due process clause to
identification evidence. Additionally, the Court should have considered whether the adoption of the totality test would increase
this hesitation.
Due to the fact that the due process challenge to eyewitness
evidence relates directly to the truth-finding process, and given
the significant impact eyewitness testimony has upon jurors, furthering the interests of justice would seem to require that the
courts employ higher standards before admitting questionable
identification evidence. In Judge Bazelon's words: "Since mistaken identifications are probably the greatest cause of erroneous
convictions, we must require the fairest identification procedures
available under the circumstances. With the stakes so high, due
process does not permit second best."8 9
Toward this end of achieving the fairest possible identification procedures, there is agreement that those police methods of
identification which embody significant elements of suggestiveness should be avoided.90 Many commentators have urged police
departments and legislatures to become involved in the promulgation of rules to ensure the use of the best identification procedures
under the circumstances.9 1 It is highly questionable whether the
"lenient" totality approach will encourage police departments and
legislatures to formulate such rules. 92 The Supreme Court, in analyzing the effect of the totality of circumstances approach upon
the administration of justice, should have explored whether the
totality test would encourage this desirable rule formulation.
88. Grano, supra note 82, at 780.
89. Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
90. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99
(1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967).
91. In suggesting that alternatives to providing counsel at lineups are available, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), wrote: "Legislative or
other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks
of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to
meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage
as 'critical.' " Id at 239. See also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117-18 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Grano, supra note 82, at 784; Pre-TrialIdentificationProcedures, supra note 81, at 818-19. For examples of the types of rules that police and legislative bodies could promulgate to increase the use of proper identification procedures, see WALL, supra note 72, at 40-64; Eisenberg & Feustel, supra note 73, at
680-81; Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Suggestion:Evolving Limitations on the
Abuse of Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 261,
301-06 (1971).
92. Grano, supra note 82, at 780-85.
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RELIABILITY
The "driving force" behind Wade and Stovall according to the
Supreme Court in Manson was the "concern that the jury not hear
eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability." 93 In fashioning what it considers to be the appropriate due
process standard for identification testimony, the Court declared
reliability to be the "linchpin" in the ultimate determination of admissibility. 94 The significance, then, of the Court's assertion that
both the per se and totality approaches are responsive to this concern cannot be overstated. In evaluating the Court's conclusion as
to the responsiveness of the totality approach in preventing the
submission of unreliable identification evidence to the jury, an examination of those variables which affect the reliability of eyewitness identification will be conducted. After discussing what factors detract from the accuracy of eyewitness identifications in
general, attention will be directed to some forms of suggestive
police behavior. Finally, the impact of these suggestive identification procedures upon the reliability of an identification and how
the courts weigh this impact under the totality test will be explored.
The process by which an individual observes an incident and
some time later recounts the details of the event involves several
components. Those who have studied perceptual psychology caution against the misconception that the mind acts as a tape recorder, acquiring information concerning an event empirically
and, when asked to recall the event, merely replaying the original
incident as observed. 95 Psychologists often divide the actual process of acquiring and recounting information into three stages: the
perception stage, during which the witness acquires information
through his sense organs; the retention stage, which describes
that period during which the witness' memory retains the data initially perceived; and the recollection stage, the time when the witness is called upon to retrieve the information that was perceived
and stored in his memory. 96 The cause of an inaccurate eyewitness
identification can occur during any of these stages. 97 In order to
V.

93. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977).
94. Id. at 114.
95. See LoFTus, supra note 74, at 21; J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 59
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL]; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Dec. 1974, at 23, 23 [hereinafter cited as Buckhout].
96. LoFTus, supra note 74, at 20-109; A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 36-161 (1979) [hereinafter cited as YARMEYI.
97. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 20-109; YARMEY, supra note 96, at 36-161; see People v.
Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973). In analyzing the Supreme Court's
position on this matter, the Anderson court concluded: "Wade and Simmons recognize the psychological factors entailed in identifications. Briefly, the causes stem
from the universal fallibilities of perception and memory. Even assuming favorable
conditions attending both the original perception and the memory period, there is
additional possibility for error inherent in the 'recognition process' itself." Id. at
202-03, 205 N.W.2d at 485.
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realize those factors which are relevant to the reliability of an eyewitness identification, consideration must be paid to the elements
that affect each of these three components.
A.

Perception

The act of perception is in no way analogous to the operation
of a camera that objectively records all that is seen. Perception instead is both selective" and subjective.9 9 Much of what occurs in
our presence is neither seen nor heard.100 For example, if an event
has little relevance to us at the time we observe it, the chances are
remote that we will perceive a significant amount of what actually
transpired.10 1 Fundamental to understanding perception is the
awareness that what we perceive depends to a large extent upon
who we are, where we have been, and what we have done before we
ever came in contact with the perceived event. Perception is an active process that involves decision making, albeit unconscious decision making, by the perceiver.10 2 Into this decision-making process enter our preconceptions, attitudes, motives, and environment.10 3 Thus, different people perceive the same event in different ways and when asked ultimately
to report the event, varied,
°
often incorrect versions result.' 0
A number of specific variables contribute to the inaccuracies
that occur during the perception stage. The emotion produced
when we observe, or worse, are the victim of a criminal attack can
have a severe impact upon our perception.109 Feelings of anxiety
and excitement, for instance, can affect our ability to observe accurately what transpires within the range of our senses. ' 6 Stress,
98. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 69, at 202; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24.
99. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 1, 10; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24.
100. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 21.
101. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 52; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24; see Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Biggers indicated that a high degree of witness attention to
the perpetrator at the time of the crime is a factor demonstrating reliability of the
identification. Id
102. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 21; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24; Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465, 475-76 (1978).
103. Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24. See also MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 10. Marshall
makes the following observation about the manner in which psychology views
perception:
It treats perception itself as the individual's awareness of a "thing" or "happening" conditioned by his similar experiences in the past and designed to
direct his behavior in the future to be consistent with what he already
knows. To these "things" or "happenings" one assigns out of his arsenal of
experience significances, meanings, and values.
Id.
104. See MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 1.
105. A. ANASTASIA, FIELDS OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 548 (1964).
106. Levine & Tapp, Psychology of CriminalIdentification,121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1091
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Levine & Tapp]; see State v. LeClair, 118 N.H. 214, 385
A.2d 831 (1978). In LeClair, the court considered the shock and excitement of the
witness to have a negative impact on the opportunity to observe. Id. at 220, 385 A.2d
at 834.
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in particular, causes the "loss of ability in intellectual function
and visual coordination.'" 0 7 Most psychologists agree that while a
mild level of arousal results in an observer's being more attentive,
markedly stressful situations have as their consequence the loss
of perception. 0 More specifically, high stress is said to result in
the witness' paying disproportionate attention to certain features
at the cost of seeing less of the entire incident. 09 This in turn produces incorrect estimates of time, distance, and sequence. 110 Related to this notion that high stress situations enhance the likelihood of misperception is the concept of weapon focus. Psychologist Elizabeth Loftus maintains that the presence of a weapon
during the commission of a crime so fixes the witness' attention
that the other details of the incident are either not perceived or
done so inaccurately.'
That which we perceive is a product not only of what is transmitted through our sense organs but also of our past experiences
and the expectations caused by those experiences." 2 Dr. Loftus divides those expectations which affect perception into four categories: cultural expectations like stereotyping; expectations from
past experiences; personal prejudices; and temporary biases
caused by specific situations."13 The classic experiment performed
by Allport and Postman in 1947 is an excellent example of the
most common of cultural stereotypes, racial bias."14 The two psychologists showed their subjects a drawing of a group of people on
a subway train, all but two of whom were seated. Standing up
were a black man wearing a suit and tie and a white man with a
razor blade in his left hand. A short time later, when asked to discuss the picture they had seen, one-half of the subjects
reported
5
seeing the razor in the possession of the black man.1
An individual can more comfortably absorb stimuli from an
event if he can place the stimuli within a known context. The danger of this principle is that in putting what we perceive in a context with which we are familiar, we tend to conform the current incident to the past experience."1 The likelihood that misperception
107. Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465, 475
(1978).
108. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 33.
109. Id at 35.
110. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 17. As to the element of time specifically, the great
danger is one of overestimation. Loftus relates one experiment in which a student
suddenly attacked his professor in front of the entire class. When the students were
asked to estimate the length of the 34 second incident, the average time reported was
81 seconds. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 30.
111. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 35-36.
112. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 10.
113. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 37-40.
114. See MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 56; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 26.
115. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 56.
116. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 37-40.
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due to expectations from past experience will occur is enhanced
when the initial perception is incomplete or contains ambiguous
information.117 Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as gap filling and suggest that these expectations serve as vehicles for making sensible and complete our less than perfect observations."8 In
Judge Jerome Frank's words: "We 'interpolate,' with unconscious
imagination, things we did not observe. We fill in what really is
but bare outline, so as to meet what our past experience leads us
to expect."11 9 This process of filling in the gaps combines with the
human psychological need to achieve a predictable and secure environment and, toward this end, perception alters observation. 2 °
B.

Retention

As with perception, the process by which we remember what
2
has been perceived is constructive rather than reproductive.1 1 It
is said that "memory does not 'mirror' the past; memory creates
the past. 1 ' 22 As with perception, memory is selective in what it re23
tains and varies to a great extent with the individual witness.1
Expectations and the filling in of details both have much the same
effect upon memory as they do on perception. 124 We tend to remember more easily those items which confirm our preconceived
notions than those which conflict with them. 2 An Aliport experiment serves as an example of the effect that the passage of time
and the tendency to fill in details can have upon our original perception. After viewing a picture of an incomplete triangle, subjects were asked to make their own drawing, recreating what they
had just seen. The drawings by the subjects were close in appearance to the original incomplete triangle. Thirty days later, however, when asked again to draw the triangle they had seen a month
before, the majority of subjects drew a triangle with all the lines
filled in. 26 The need to have a memory of the triangle that was
both logical and complete overcame the sense impression originally gained by the witnesses.
In addition to being affected by some of those factors which
also influence perception, inaccuracies during the retention stage
can be caused by factors that particularly affect the memory proc117. See, e.g., Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1108. When the stimulus situation is
ambiguous, the individual is more likely to be influenced by past experiences, needs,
and expectations than by the stimuli themselves. Id.
118. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 20.
119. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 69, at 201.
120. See MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 10.
121. Buckhout, supra note 95, at 221; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1105.
122. FRANK & FRANK, supra note 69, at 208.
123. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 29; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 24.
124. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 212-13, 205 N.W.2d 461, 490 (1973).
125. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 29.
126. See Buckhout, supra note 95, at 27.
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ess. Psychological research indicates that between the time something enters our memory and the moment we are asked to recall it,
new information acquired in the interim can alter the original
event as we remember it. This concept is called retroactive inhibition.127 Experiments have demonstrated that "[p]ostevent information can not only enhance existing memories but also can
change a witness' memory and even cause non-existent details 1to28
become incorporated into a previously acquired memory.
Moreover, if the new piece of information conflicts with the existing memory, the prevailing human need is to compromise the two
to achieve harmony. 29 Once again, the accuracy of the original
memory suffers.
In looking to the reliability of the testimony of eyewitnesses
to criminal incidents, courts should be especially wary of the possible effects created when information concerning a crime is supplied to the witnesses after the incident. Loftus tells of an event
staged before witnesses, unaware of being used as subjects in an
experiment, that demonstrates the danger of postevent information. In the view of these witnesses, a man picked up a pocketbook, supposedly forgotten by a woman, and pretended to remove
something from inside. Shortly thereafter, the "victim" returned
and vociferously bemoaned the theft of her tape recorder.so One
week later, when asked to recount their observations, the majority
of the witnesses indicated that they saw the tape recorder and
most of them were able to describe it in detail.1 31 Similarly, an interview of witnesses conducted by the police during a criminal investigation can be an occasion for imparting as well as obtaining
information. 32 As with the aforementioned experiment, information, even unconsciously imparted by the police, can become part
of the witness' memory of the crime and be a source of inaccu-

racy. 133

127. Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1100.
128. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 55. See also id. at 55-56 (experiments on effects of inaccurate newspaper report and altering the information supplied in the question upon the
accuracies of memory).
129. Id. at 56-58.
130. Id. at 62.
131. Id.
132. The danger of the police officer's imparting information during his interview of the
witness is especially significant when the officer has already formed impressions
about how the crime was committed or the identity of the perpetrator. See id. at
75-76.
133. See United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063 (6th Cir. 1976). The Russell court
observed: "ITlhe construction of memory is greatly influenced by post experience
suggestion. Suggestions compatible with the witness' internalized stereotype are
likely to become part of the witness' memory, not because they are in fact similar to
the actual experience, but because they fit the preconceived stereotype." Id at 1066.
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C. Recollection
Some of the forces that influence the recollection stage have
similar effects on perception and memory, while the problems
caused by other factors are unique to recognition and recall. In
looking to the potential for unreliability created during the recollection stage, attention will be paid first to internal psychological
factors that can impair accuracy even in the absence of third party
suggestion. Thereafter, the impact that suggestive police conduct
can have on the reliability of an identification will be examined.
Recall can be defined as the process of retrieving information
from our memory without the use of explicit cues to facilitate this
retrieval; recognition, on the other hand, involves the retrieval of
information with the assistance of certain memory cues to assist
in the process.14 Asking a witness to describe a suspect is an attempt at recall, while displaying suspects in a lineup, showup, or
photographic array are examples of recognition processes. It is to
this recognition process that the police invariably and necessarily
turn in their efforts to identify the perpetrators of crimes. When a
witness recognizes someone, he is actually saying that the person
identified has certain characteristics similar to the individual originally perceived.' 35 Because we perceive only a part of what we
see'3 6 and we retain only a portion of what we perceive,137 it is quite
possible that a positive identification may result even though
there exists only a limited commonality of traits between the criminal observed and the suspect displayed. 3 8 Dean Wigmore illustrates this by referring to two people, one of whom, the criminal,
has perceivable characteristics bcd efg; the other, the person presented for identification, has traits bcd mnp. If all or part of traits
bcd of the criminal were perceived and retained, and some or all of
traits efg were forgotten or not perceived by the witness, the person presented at the identification proceeding possessing those
overlapping traits will likely be identified.' 39 The influence of overt
suggestion in this recognition process will be explored below but,
even absent such impropriety, the possibility for an unreliable
identification stemming from the recognition process alone is real.
Another factor, apart from overt suggestion, that can contribute to an inaccurate identification is referred to by psychologists
as unconscious transference. If a witness has seen a person prior
to the identification proceeding, particularly if that observation

134. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 204, 205 N.W.2d 461, 485-86 (1973); YARMEY,
supra note 96, at 54.
135. WALL, supra note 72, at 9-10.
136. See notes 95-120 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 121-33 and accompanying text supra.
138. WALL,

139. J.

supra note 72, at 10.

WIGMORE, SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF

§§

250-251

(1937).
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occurred at either a time or place close to the criminal incident,
there is an increased likelihood that this previously seen person
will be selected.140 In a 1974 experiment, a group of students who
witnessed a staged attack upon their professor were asked some
weeks later to select the assailant from among six photographs.
Included in the array were the actual assailant and an innocent
person present at the time of the attack.1 41 Of those witnesses who
chose one of the incorrect five photographs, forty percent, or twice
of the inas many as statistically indicated, opted for the picture
142
nocent person present when the attack occurred.
Those who study human behavior attribute much of the misidentification that occurs at identification proceedings to the
needs on the part of witnesses and victims to identify someone."'
This need or motivation to produce a positive response can be
caused by several different factors. Professor Borchard maintained: "Into the identification enter other motives, not necessarily stimulated originally by the accused personally - the desire
to requite a crime, to exact vengeance upon the person believed
guilty, to find a scapegoat, to support, consciously or unconsciously, an identification already made by another. ' ' 144 The anger
within him resulting from the often terrifying or degrading criminal incident can produce in a victim the desire to avenge himself
upon the most likely target, the suspect.1 4 ' The corresponding

140. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 142-44; Bonamico, Case History, Georgia v. Meece, Soc.
ACT. & L., Nov. 1979, at 53. In describing the phenomenon of unconscious
transference, Bonamico stated:
[Tihe victim may be identifying a particular person whom she has seen
before in the vicinity of the crime, but who may not be the actual assailant.
This is similar to the situation wherein we can recognize a face, but we cannot quite place it. Psychological research has shown that if the face of a
related, but innocent person appears in a photospread, it is very likely to be
identified by a witness.
Id at 59.
141. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 142.
142. Id See also Simos v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 251, 265 N.W.2d 278 (1978). In Simos, the
phenomenon of unconscious transference may have contributed to the victim's identification. After being robbed in her house, a 72-year-old woman told the police that
she believed the man who had repaired her chimney several months earlier was the
robber. Unable to identify the defendant's photograph at the first two displays, the
victim, after looking at a third photo display, picked up the photograph of the defendant and said the robber looked like this but was darker. Thereupon the police officer
told the victim that the photograph she had referred to was that of the "chimney
man." Eight days later, the complainant identified the defendant at a lineup. Id. at
253, 265 N.W.2d at 279. In finding both the lineup and in-court identifications to be
reliable (although the prosecutor used only the in-court identification at trial), the
court indicated that these identifications met the Biggers standards. Id. at 255-56,
265 N.W.2d at 280.
143. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 109; YARMEY, supra note 96, at 155; Buckhout, supra note
95, at 27-30; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1108-15.
144. BORCHARD, supra note 67, at xiii.
145. Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465, 473
(1978); see MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 39; YARMEY, supra note 96,at 155.
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need of the nonvictim witness to identify may be the product of a
desire to perform one's civic duty and to contribute to the solution
1 46
of the crime and the punishment of the deserving offender.
In exploring the manner in which human motivations contribute to positive responses at identification proceedings, it should
be noted that the proceeding itself tends to be an anxiety-producing event for the witness. 147 The significance of this type of anxiety relates to the principle of cognitive dissonance. If, in his attempt at recollection of an incident, the witness becomes aware of
a contradiction within his account itself or between his story and
that of another person, a degree of tension will likely result.148 The
common human need to reduce tension may result in a witness' attempting to ensure that his story becomes consistent both in itself
149
and with the other information available concerning the crime.
Thus, although the stress inherent in an identification proceeding
may reduce accuracy, the need to make some type of identification
may in fact be increased. 15 0
To comprehend fully the contribution that human motivations make in producing positive identifications, the act of recollection must be viewed within the social context in which it occurs. As Solomon Asch demonstrated in a 1955 experiment, the
impact of others in effecting an alteration in our recollection can
be most profound. Asch had groups of seven people, six of whom
were his collaborators, look at two drawn lines. Later, when asked
which of the two lines was longer, the six collaborators, always the
first six called upon to respond, answered incorrectly that line A
was longer.15 The remaining subjects, who had heard others report the results incorrectly, were then asked the same question.
The majority of subjects answered incorrectly that A was the
longer line, apparently unconsciously opting for conformity over
accuracy.1 52 The significance of this tendency toward conformity

146.

MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 39. See also BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 244.
147. Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1098.
148. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 39-40.
149. Id
150. This need to make n identification of some kind during the display has been attributed specifically to the human intolerance of ambiguity and the drive for understanding. See Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1098.
151. Buckhout, supra note 95, at 28.
152. Id; see MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 40.
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is clear when witnesses are permitted to view the identification
display together.'5 3
In addition to being susceptible to the social need for tensionreducing conformity, the witness may be prompted to make an
identification out of an unconscious desire to please the investigating police officer.15 4 Some people particularly seek the approval
of authority figures and a police officer is often so perceived.' 55
Furthermore, most people share the motivation to avoid appearing stupid or unobservant in front of others, a not uncommon emotion after failing to recall something recently seen.16 All of these
motivations suggest that when witnesses to crimes are presented
with a suspect or a group of suspects and asked by the police to
make an identification, there are psychological reasons militating
against a response of "I don't know."'6 7 When a witness removes
"I don't know" from his list of choices, the selection he makes at
the lineup or photographic array is not necessarily the person he
believes to be the criminal but instead may be the individual
among those displayed who most looks like the criminal. 5
D. Impact of Suggestive Police Practices
While it is essential to understand those factors inherent in
the human system of perception, retention, and recollection that
influence the reliability of an eyewitness identification, it is the
impact of suggestive government conduct upon reliability that is

153. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (lineup display conducted before an
audience of nearly 100 eyewitnesses); Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1978) (opportunity of two eyewitnesses to discuss first lineup prior to identifying
defendant at second lineup was contributing factor to reversal of conviction based on
due process violation).
For an example of how courts feel constrained by the totality of circumstances
approach, see United States ex rel Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1974).
Finding the Biggers reliability factors to have been substantially satisfied, the court
in Cannonaffirmed the defendant's conviction despite a joint viewing by two victims.
The court noted in passing that "given the potential for error caused by group pressure and the only minimal increased burden created by requiring all identifications to
be made separately, there would seem to be no excuse for allowing a procedure which
permits two or more witnesses to discuss their identification." Id. at 201. Add to this
potential for error the fact that individuals tend to be even more likely to act based
upon what others do when they find themselves in unusual or threatening situations,
and the danger of joint viewings is further exacerbated.
154. Wells, Leippe & Ostroms, Guidelines for Empirically Assessing the Fairness of a
Lineup, 3 LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 285, 286 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wells]; see
Buckhout, supra note 95, at 27.
155. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 98; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1115.
156. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 52; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1109.
157. It has been argued that the social pressure inherent in any lineup is likely to encourage a positive response. Buckhout, supra note 95, at 30. This pressure for an identification of some kind would likely be increased in a one-on-one presentation where the
police investigation has obviously focused on only one suspect.
158. See text accompanying notes 136-39 supra.
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directly at issue in due process challenges under the totality of circumstances approach. Given all the other factors that affect the
reliability of eyewitness identifications, the degree of human
susceptibility to overt suggestion can be high. Although the Manson Supreme Court, in adopting the Biggers factors, offered
guidelines to determine reliability, it failed to articulate such criteria in evaluating the other side of the scale, suggestiveness.
Police and lower courts were not given examples of what types of
identification procedures were objectionable and, perhaps more
important in a weighing process, what forms of suggestive behavior were more likely than others to result in an unreliable identification. It becomes necessary, then, to examine the various
manners in which suggestion is communicated, the impact of each
method upon reliability, and the application of the totality approach to these forms of suggestive identification procedures.
Only then can it be ascertained if the totality of circumstances
test is serving the societal interest, outlined in Manson, of preventing unreliable identification evidence from being submitted to
the jury.
Psychologists and jurists have long been aware of the detrimental effect suggestiveness has upon the reliability of an identification. In his much cited book, On the Witness Stand, Hugo
Munsterberg described the power of suggestion as "one factor
which, more than anything else, devastates memory and plays
havoc with our best intended recollections. 1 ' 59 Writing for the
Court in Wade, Justice Brennan referred to the major role suggestion plays in the injustices caused by misidentification. 160 The
forms that suggestion takes can be overt or subtle, 161 intentional,
or without the knowledge of the party communicating the suggestion..16 A proceeding by its nature can be somewhat suggestive,
such as the viewing by the witness of only one photograph or one
live suspect, or it can have the relative fairness of a lineup or a
photographic array but be compromised by the manner in which
the presentation is conducted. Suggestion can occur through improper statements or nonverbal cues. Moreover, whatever type of
suggestion is employed can be severely aggravated, turning a
mildly suggestive proceeding into a situation wherein "[in effect,
the police repeatedly [say] to the witness, 'This is the man.' ",163
159. H. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 69 (1908) [hereinafter cited as MUNSTERBERG].

160. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). In addition, Justice Brennan wrote:
"[Tihe influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably
accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other single factor-perhaps it is
responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined." Id at 229 (quoting
P. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 26 (1965)).
161. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967).
162. Id at 235. See also FRANK & FRANK, supra note 69, at 62; Fanselow, How to Bias an
Eyewitness, Soc. ACT. & L., May 1975, at 3,3; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1114.
163. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
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The presentation of a single suspect or a single photograph
has been widely condemned as unduly suggestive.1 64 One commentator has asserted that the showup "constitutes the most grossly
suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the
police."

165 The

Supreme Court on several occasions has expressed

its explicit disapproval of the use of one-on-one confrontations to
achieve eyewitness identifications, 16 as have appellate courts on
both the state and federal levels. 161 The grave danger present in
any situation where no option is offered to the eyewitness is that
he is likely to conclude that the police have determined the subject
to be the perpetrator.6 8' Particularly disturbing is the presentation of a suspect to a witness in a one-on-one manner after the wit-

164. See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); YARMEY, supra note 96, at 153.
Yarmey noted that "the showup has to be the most biased and suggestive procedure
for guilt yet devised by the police." Id. In regard to displays of single photographs,
the psychological factors of such exhibitions favor identification rather than repudiation of identity. BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 261.
165. WALL, supra note 72, at 28.
166. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Court declared that the danger
of misidentification "will be increased if the police display to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he saw." I&. at 383. See
also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). Even in Manson the Court maintained
that such a one-on-one presentation "may be viewed in general with suspicion." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
167. For federal cases explicitly disapproving the practice, see, for example, Hudson v.
Blackburn, 601 F.2d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 1979); Bloodworth v. Hopper, 539 F.2d 1382,
1383 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The display of pictures solely of the subject is one of the most
suggestive and hence most objectionable methods of identification."); Gonzalez v.
Hammock, 477 F. Supp. 730, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[hIts use, especially in a police station when less suggestive methods are available, has generally been condemned as
the least reliable form of eyewitness identification.")
For state cases, see, for example, Towns v. State, 136 Ga. 467, 221 S.E.2d 631
(1975); Commonwealth v. Moon, 394 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979), affd, 405
N.E.2d 947 (Mass. 1980); State v. Tuttle, 33 N.C. App. 465, 235 S.E.2d 412 (1977);
Bennett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1975).
168. Before his elevation to the Supreme Court, then Judge John Paul Stevens, speaking
for the court in United States ex rel Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1975),
articulated the danger of showup identifications: "Without question, almost any oneto-one confrontation between a victim of crime and a person whom the police present
to him as a suspect must convey the message that the police have reason to believe
him guilty." Id. at 403 (footnote omitted); see WALL, supra note 72, at 28-30.
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ness has9 failed to select the suspect from a lineup or photographic
6
array. 1
Through its decisions in Biggers and Manson, the Supreme
Court has made clear that, despite the elements of suggestivity
present, the one-on-one identification proceeding, whether done
corporeally or by photograph, does not by itself violate due process. What is not so clear is what the Court would consider impermissible aggravation of the already suggestive showup procedure.170 One method of exacerbating the problems inherent in the
one-on-one presentation is to display the suspect in a physical setting connoting guilt. Having the witness observe the suspect
handcuffed or while locked in a jail cell conveys a less than subtle
message to the witness. Although some courts have excluded eyewitness testimony based on such presentations, 171 others, finding
aspects of reliability, have affirmed convictions in cases involving
this type of aggravated showup situation.172
169. For cases in which an identification of the defendant or his photograph when seen
alone was excluded because it was done subsequent to the failure of the witness to
choose the defendant from an array or lineup, see State v. Strickland, 113 Ariz. 445,
556 P.2d 320 (1976) (after twice failing to identify defendant at lineup and then at
photo array, victim identified defendant, who was wearing jail clothing, at preliminary hearing); State v. Sutfield, 354 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1978); State v. LeClair, 118 N.H.
214, 385 A.2d 831 (1978) (extremely tentative identification of defendant's photograph, followed by police confirming remarks and subsequent display of defendant's
photograph and the defendant himself both alone). Contra, United States v. Williams,
596 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979) (witness, unable to identify robber from photo array conducted two years after crime, walked into court when trial was in session and
observed defendant at counsel table for ten minutes; although identification of defendant was admittedly suggestive and occurred two years and eight months after robbery, court upheld in-court identification, attributing her earlier failure to select
defendant's photograph to "precision" and "caution"); United States ex reL Lucas v.
Regan, 503 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1974) (90 minutes after identifying another party as robber
at lineup conducted without defendant and confirming this selection at showup, victim viewed defendant alone and "corrected" herself, implicating defendant; procedure upheld by court based on satisfying Biggers factors); Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d
615 (9th Cir. 1974) (victim, who selected two of her three assailants at lineup but
failed to select defendant, identified defendant at preliminary hearing when he was
seated next to the two perpetrators already identified).
170. From the process articulated in Manson, of weighing the suggestiveness of the identification proceeding against the reliability determined by the Biggersfactors, Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977), apparently the more the reliability factors are
satisfied, the greater the degree of suggestion that will be tolerated.
171. E.g., Gonzalez v. Hammock, 477 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); State v. Comeau, 409
A.2d 247 (Me. 1979); State v. Kennedy, 249 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1978).
172. E.g., McGuff v. Alabama, 566 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant identified by some
witnesses while alone in cell and despite court's extreme dislike of this practice);
State v. Dickerson, 568 S.W.2d 559 (Mo. 1978) (identification of defendant outside
jail cell while in handcuffs by victim who was informed he was about to view man
found in his recently stolen car); State v. Delahunt, 401 A.2d 1261 (R.I. 1979) (identification obtained while defendant illuminated by headlights from police car and while
handcuffed and surrounded by police permissible because of danger of escape); Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 (Wyo. 1979) (notwithstanding judge's suspension of preliminary hearing as "farce" because defendant compelled to appear there handcuffed
and in prison garb for identification, prosecution should have been given opportunity
to show reliability).
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Whereas displaying either the suspect or his photograph
alone to the eyewitness implicitly communicates that the authorities believe the subject to be the guilty party, quite often the
police will be more explicit. Before or during the identification confrontation, the police might, for example, inform the witness that
he will be viewing a suspect or the suspect. This form of overt verbal focusing was specifically condemned by the Supreme Court in
Wade.17 3 Once again, although some courts have deemed identifications obtained after such suggestive comments to be violative
of due process, 7 4 others have permitted showup identifications accompanied by objectionable remarks, declaring the conduct to be
not that suggestive or finding reliability in the identification." 5 A
case decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky including such
a police statement serves as an example of how the balancing test
derived from Manson is applied by the courts. The opinion in
Brown v. Commonwealth 76 relates how forty-five minutes after
they had been the victims of a robbery, two people were taken by
the police to an area outside a motel where two suspects had been
apprehended. Informed by the officer that "they thought they
had the guys," the complainants viewed the two defendants who
were standing together, handcuffed, illuminated by the headlights
of a police car.1 77 The court, holding this was not inadmissible on
its face, 1 8 reasoned that whatever suggestivity occurred was outweighed by the fact that the witnesses had viewed the robbers for
one minute during the incident in a lit restaurant and that the
showup was shortly after the crime.1 79 That a one minute observation under obviously stressful conditions can overcome conduct
that so obviously conveys to the witnesses that "these are the
men" sheds serious doubt upon whether this court fully comprehended the impact suggestion has in producing an identification.
173. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967).
174. Cases so holding invariably involve identifications containing additional elements of
suggestion. E.g., Commonwealth v. Moon, 394 N.E.2d 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (in
front of witness, one police officer said, "it must be Andrew Moon," shortly before
witness identified defendant's picture from a driver's license with the name "Andrew
Moon" on it), aff'd, 405 N.E.2d 947 (Mass. 1980); People v. Mercado, 63 A.D.2d 720,
405 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1978) (victim informed she was to identify her assailant, then
shown both defendants together through one-way mirror); State v. Kennedy, 249
S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1978) (witness, who was never closer than 40 feet from robber,
told he would see suspect before defendant brought in wearing handcuffs).
175. E.g., State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1976) (witness told "we think we caught them"
before showup), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977); State v. Dickerson, 568 S.W.2d 559
(Mo. 1978) (victim, told he would see suspect found in his recently stolen car, shown
defendant handcuffed and in jail cell); Bennett v. State, 530 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1975)
(prior to lineup, witness shown defendant's photo and told police had picked up this
suspect).
176. 564 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1978).
177. Id. at 28.
178. The court remanded the case for further fact finding. Id at 29.
179. Id
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Regardless of whether the identification proceeding is a lineup
or photographic array, or a one-on-one confrontation, police comments indicating that one of the persons being viewed is a suspect
will greatly increase the probability of obtaining an identification.
The effect of informing a witness that a suspect is included in a
lineup was demonstrated in a 1975 experiment. In that experiment, one half of those who observed a staged criminal incident
were told that a suspect would be present in the lineup they were
about to view; the other half were informed only that one might be
present. 8 0 Although the culprit was not in fact included in the
lineup, twenty-eight percent of those told he would be present selected someone in the lineup as the criminal, while only four percent of the second group made inaccurate identifications. 8' Recognizing this danger, the Supreme Court of Indiana concluded:
A witness may thus be led to feel that he has an obligation
to choose one of the participants in the display since the
police evidently are satisfied that they have apprehended
the criminal. The result may be that the witness strains to
pick someone with familiar characteristics or someone
who most resembles the actual criminal or the result may
be that the witness will choose
the one least dissimilar by
2
the process of elimination.1s
Some courts, on the other hand, have taken the position that anytime a witness is asked to partake in an identification proceeding,
he is likely to be aware that the police have placed a suspect in the
display. Therefore, they reason, merely informing the witness that
a suspect is present contributes little to his motivation to identify
someone.1 3 This reasoning seems both to discount the effect upon
a witness of the overt suggestion by an authority figure18 4 and to
imply that because some suggestion is inherently present in all

180. YARMEY, supra note 96, at 156-57.
181. Id. at 157.
182. Sawyer v. State, 260 Ind. 597, 602, 298 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1973).
183. See, e.g., Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1977). See also United States v.
Medina, 552 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1977). The victim in Medina, while viewing a lineup
consisting of three individuals in addition to the defendant, indicated he was afraid
he might choose the wrong man. Thereupon a police officer told the victim that "the
man is out there" and he should be able to make an identification. Id. at 187. The victim then identified the defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit declared that this identification was not violative of due process notwithstanding the additional factor that only two men in the lineup had moustaches as
did the perpetrator. In commenting upon the police conduct of informing the victim
that the robber was present in the lineup, the court reasoned: "Whenever a witness is
asked to view a lineup, an inference may often be present that a definite suspect is
among those taking part in the lineup. Thus, the statement by the police did not
make the selection of defendant more likely." Id. at 190.
184. See text accompanying notes 154-55 supra.
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identification proceedings, further improper
conduct that is
8 5
merely cumulative is not unacceptable.1

In understanding the manner in which the totality of circumstances approach has been employed to defeat suppression motions directed at police comments during a lineup, Landry v.
Alabama,186 decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, is instructive. One day after the commission of a
murder, a witness to the crime was asked to view a lineup consisting of eight men. All five suspects believed by the police to be the
murderers were included in the display. 187 During the identification confrontation, the officer conducting the lineup pointed out
these five men to the witness.8 8 Notwithstanding the lack of testimony concerning the degree of certainty with which the identification was made and the absence of a prior description, the court of
appeals refused to find this identification to be a violation of due
process because of the "ample opportunity to view" the defendant
and the brief interval between the crime and the identification.8 9
That the court felt no need to detail this "ample opportunity" is
troubling because this conclusion was crucial to its holding. Far
more disturbing, however, is the court's seeming lack of concern
with the blatant focusing undertaken by the officer conducting
the lineup. The potential impact upon the ultimate identification
185. For other cases permitting identification testimony after a witness is informed of the
presence of a suspect in a lineup or photo array, see United States v. Moskowitz, 581
F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1978) (victim, informed after lineup that she had chosen wrong man
and other witnesses had selected the correct person, then selected defendant while
looking at photograph of lineup); Wilkens v. Sumner, 475 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Va.
1979); Kennedy v. State, 44 Md. App. 662,410 A.2d 1097 (1980); State v. Upham, 418
A.2d 1029 (R.I. 1980).
186. 579 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1978).
187. Id at 354. This procedure of including in the same display more than one person
believed to be involved in a crime is, in itself, quite suggestive. There is a grave risk
that if the witness recognizes one of the men as the culprit, he might be tempted to
assume that others standing with him were also involved in the crime. This risk is
even clearer than in a showup situation:
IT]he joint viewing of several suspects in connection with a crime committed
by the equivalent number, presents an even greater danger of misidentification than the classic single person show-up .... For if it should be the fact
that one or more of those viewed in fact participated in the crime ....
a
witness accurately recognizing one or more participants might be influenced
by the fact of the joint showing to identify the innocent person.
People v. Adams, 70 A.D.2d 825, 826, 417 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (1979) (Sandier, J., concurring) (citations omitted). For cases permitting identification testimony after the
viewing of several suspects jointly, see United States v. Osborne, 630 F.2d 374 (5th
Cir. 1980) (witness told two individuals stopped in the area before identifying defendants together); Baker v. Hocker, 496 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant identified
while seated at counsel table with two other individuals previously identified and notwithstanding witness' previous failure to identify defendant); Clempson v. State, 144
Ga. App. 625, 241 S.E.2d 495 (1978) (five suspects identified together while standing
in front of police car); In re Mark J., 96 Misc. 2d 733, 412 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979).
188. 579 F.2d 353, 354 (5th Cir. 1978).
189. Id at 355.
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made by a witness to a homicide of specifically singling out five of
the eight men displayed is serious enough to warrant far more attention than was paid by the court. Once again, the apparent unawareness of the court to the serious effect such focusing has
upon the reliability of an identification undermined the interests
behind the totality of circumstances approach.
Among those forms of suggestion the Supreme Court cautioned against in Wade was the lineup in which the "look alikes"
are grossly dissimilar in appearance to the suspect. 190 Any physical trait that singles out the suspect from the other lineup participants can serve to direct the witness' attention to that individual
and produce an "identification thru accentuation."' 191 A lineup or
photographic array should be comparable to a multiple choice examination where all or at least most of the alternatives are plausible selections. 192 Included among those physical traits which may
make a suspect appear different from the other display participants are height, weight, race, age, clothing, and distinguishing
characteristics such as limps or scars. 193 Additional focusing features pertaining to photographic arrays include the showing of a
"mug shot" of only the suspect, including two photos of the susa different
pect and one of the "look alikes," and the appearance1 9of
4
expression on the photograph of the suspect's face.
When the suspect appears different from other participants in
a lineup or photographic array, the attention of the witness is initially focused upon him. If, however, the trait that caused the suspect to appear distinctive is also an element of the description of
the criminal previously provided by the witness, this suggestion is
significantly compounded.195 For example, a lineup in which the
suspect is the only participant wearing a green hat is suggestive.
If, however, the witness had previously informed the authorities

190. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967). See also YARMEY, supra note 96, at
156.
191. WALL, supra note 72, at 53. See also Buckhout, supra note 95, at 27.
192. See LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 145-56; Buckhout, supra note 95, at 27.
193. For more detailed lists of the types of distinguishing physical characteristics relevant to identifications, see SOBEL, supra note 4, § 56.03 at 104-05 (1972); WALL, supra
note 72, at 53-56.
194. See Buckhout, supra note 95, at 28-30.
195. See SOBEL, supra note 4, § 56.03 at 105 (1972).
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that his assailant wore a green hat, the police have come much
closer to saying "this is the man." 9 6 This manner of focusing, i.e.,
relating the suspect directly to the perpetrator through the use of
some physical characteristic or distinguishing object in the witness' original description, can occur when the suspect is presented
alone or with others.
A recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit provides an illustration both of how the absence of clear suggestivity guidelines can result in questionable
judicial conclusions as to what constitutes suggestion and how
the Manson due process approach is employed to uphold grossly
suggestive identification procedures. Frank v. Blackburn 197 involved a restaurant robbery, shortly after which the defendant
was apprehended nearby and brought back to the victim for an
identification. The original description of the robber supplied by
the victim was of a black male with a goatee, who wore a coat, knit
cap, and sunglasses.19 After viewing the defendant alone back at
the restaurant, the victim was "unable to identify Frank as the
perpetrator of the crime."' 99 The victim was then removed from
the room while the defendant donned the coat, knit cap, and sunglasses in his possession at the time he was apprehended. Upon
being asked again to view the defendant, the victim made an identification "with some hesitation and reservation. '200 The court of
appeals found this procedure to be neither suggestive nor unreliable. Citing Stovall, the court first pointed out the necessity of obtaining either a positive or negative identification as soon as possible. As to the suggestiveness of the procedure, the court merely
said, "there were no words or actions by police aggravating the
'
suggestiveness of the confrontation,"01
despite the fact that the
victim initially failed to identify the defendant as the robber and
was only able to make an identification when the defendant subse-

196. See Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36 (5th Cir. 1967). In Crume, the court made the following observation:
The fault common to all these practices is that the police single out one person and influence the witness by directing attention to some element known
to be connected with the crime-the unique appearance of the suspect, the
words spoken in the course of the crime, or clothing similar to the suspect's
clothing. The necessary result of this singling out is to suggest to the witness that the suspect so isolated is in fact the one the police think is guilty.
It is easy to see how such practices prejudice the reliability of the identification.
Id at 39.
197. 605 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1979).
198. Id at 911-12.
199. Id. at 912.
200. I&
201. Id. at 913.
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quently donned the incriminating clothing.
The message con20 2
veyed to this witness was clear and overt.
Although finding the conduct employed in this proceeding to
be not impermissibly suggestive, the Frank court added that the
eyewitness testimony here should not be suppressed in any event.
Notwithstanding the witness' admitted hesitation and reservation in identifying the defendant, the court found the identification to be reliable based on the presence of the other reliability factors derived from Biggers and Manson.2 °3 One of those factors
cited by the court was the accuracy of the victim's description of
the robber. Other than the reference to the clothing and glasses
worn by the robber, this description is limited to a black male with
a goatee. What removes this description from being general in
nature primarily is the description of the clothing. When, as here,
one set of items is of particular importance in a description, the
procedure of displaying only one person who happens to be wearing those distinguishing items poses serious danger of misidentification.2 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has written:
Similarly with respect to that clothing, there is no justifiable reason for not allowing the suspected individual to
remove highly distinctive clothing or in the alternative to
supply similar clothing to others in the lineup. This is especially true in cases where the clothing worn was an integral part of the description given and there exists the likelihood that a misidentification may occur because an identifying witness has his attention focussed exclusively on
the clothes worn and thereby distracted from other important physical characteristics. 0 5
There is no better means to focus the attention of the witness "exclusively on the clothes worn" than to display the suspect to the
witness first absent the incriminating clothing and then, shortly
thereafter, to show him wearing the aforementioned articles.

202. For a discussion concerning the effect of a one-on-one presentation upon a witness,
see notes 164-69 and accompanying text supra
203. 605 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1979).
204. See Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966), cited with approval in Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967). Commenting on the danger presented by distinguishing features, the Palmer court stated:
Where the witness bases the identification on only part of the suspect's total
personality, such as height alone, or eyes alone, or voice alone, prior suggestions will have most fertile soil in which to grow to conviction. This is especially so when the identifier is presented with no alternative choices; there is
then a strong predisposition to overcome doubts and to fasten guilt upon the
lone suspect.
359 F.2d at 201.
205. United States ex rel Pierce v. Cannon, 508 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1974).
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Referring to the clothing and glasses, the Frank court made
note of the fact that all the defendant was asked to do was to don
the very articles with which he was apprehended.2 0 6 However, the
fact that the defendant was apprehended in possession of clothing
and sunglasses matching the victim's description is relevant only
in assessing the reliability factors of Biggers and does not justify
or mitigate the suggestiveness that accrues from such a display.
In analyzing these factors, the accuracy of the description can be
buttressed by the awareness that the defendant wore clothing and
glasses similar to that of the robber when the defendant was arrested shortly after the crime. Nevertheless, the reason that the
suspect should not be shown to the witness wearing the incriminating items is because the focusing effect of the clothing can produce misidentification. 20 7 Whether or not the police obtained the
incriminating items from the defendant in no way alters this effect
upon the witness.
Moreover, the fact that the defendant was arrested wearing
items or possessing distinguishing characteristics described by
the witness after the crime can serve as valuable evidence to the
prosecution at trial and need not be used for identification purposes. As with the existence of a confession, other identification
testimony, or the possession by the defendant of the fruits of the
crime, the clothing worn by the defendant when arrested can be indicative of his culpability and therefore admissible at his trial. As
with this other evidence, however, injecting incriminating clothing into the identification procedure is grossly suggestive and
without justification. 20 8

206. 605 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1979). Some cases have indicated that whatever suggestion accrues from displaying the suspect wearing incriminating clothing is somehow
mitigated if the clothing belongs to the suspect. E.g., Willis v. Garrison, 624 F.2d
491, 494-95 (4th Cir. 1980); Young v. United States, 407 F.2d 720, 721 (D.C. Cir.),
cert denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969).
207. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1968).
208. For a recent case demonstrating a court's underestimation of the effect of incriminating clothing upon a witness' identification, see Willis v. Garrison, 624 F.2d 491 (4th
Cir. 1980). In Willis, a robbery victim initially failed to identify the defendant as he
got out of the police cruiser. Id. at 493. The victim then asked the officer if the defendant was apprehended while wearing a black jacket and broad-brimmed hat, both of
which were contained in his original description. The defendant apparently was told
to don the jacket and hat he was wearing when arrested, and the victim made a positive identification. Notwithstanding that the "distance, together with the poor light,
prevented [the victim] from discerning any of the facial features of the robber other
than his complexion," icd at 492, the court found this identification to be reliable. Accord, People v. Dortch, 64 Il. App. 3d 894,381 N.E.2d 1193 (1978); State v. Washington, 257 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1008 (1978). In Dortch, the
name of the defendant rather than his clothing proved to be the incriminating
feature. The witness, who was aware of the perpetrator's name, saw one photograph
of the defendant on which the same name was clearly displayed. 64 Ill. App. 3d at
899, 381 N.E.2d at 1196.
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The focusing and potential for misidentification that results
from displaying the suspect with an item or characteristic contained in the witness' original description can affect the viewer of
a lineup or photographic array as well as one who sees a one-on-one
display. In the only case in which the Supreme Court suppressed
eyewitness testimony because of a due process violation, Fosterv.
California2 0 9 this form of lineup focusing was a contributing factor. Notwithstanding the serious possibility of misidentification
produced by such focusing, courts have permitted identification
testimony under the totality of circumstances approach in situations in which the suspect was the only person in a lineup or photographic array who shared a common characteristic with that of
the description of the perpetrator given by the witness. 2 10 The reasoning common to all of these cases was that the reliability factors
outlined by the Supreme Court in Biggers and reiterated in Manson required the admission of the suggestive eyewitness testimony involved. Had the Supreme Court, when fashioning its due
process test, articulated the types of suggestive conduct to be
avoided and particularly distinguished that conduct which is
somewhat suggestive from that behavior which focuses the witness unavoidably upon the suspect, the decisions in the lower
fully reflect the impact of gross suggestion
courts might more
2 11
upon reliability.
Another form of suggestivity employed by police in procuring
eyewitness identifications is the use of what has been referred to
as the "photo-biased lineup." The display of a single photograph
of the suspect or a photographic array with the suspect's picture
included prior to the exhibition of the suspect at a lineup is said to
have a significant effect upon the outcome of the lineup. Dr. Lof-

209. 394 U.S. 440 (1968).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 602 F.2d 834 (8th Cir.) (bib overalls), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 902 (1979); Royal v. Maryland, 529 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1976) (short slight
man with a detectable limp); State v. Montgomery, 588 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. 1979) (a shirtless 5 '2" man-all other lineup participants taller and wearing shirts); State v. Carter,
572 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. 1978) (black shirt with white flowers); State v. Heald, 120 N.H.
319, 414 A.2d 1288 (1980) (man looking over forty years old); In re Mark J., 96 Misc.
2d 733, 412 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979) (three black men wearing tan and denim
jackets-other lineup participants white or mulatto and differently attired); Schaffer
v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 673, 250 N.W.2d 326 (1977) (gold earring).
211. One commentator, in referring to this type of suggestion, wrote:
[Wihere a similarity exists between the physical characteristics of the perpetrator of the crime and those of a suspect, this similarity may cause a false
recognition and an erroneous identification. A false recognition may also be
caused by a similarity in clothing, for the clothes worn by the criminal may
have made, consciously or subconsciously, a greater impression upon the
mind of the witness than any physical characteristic.
WALL, supra note 72, at 31.
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tus asserts that, in such photo-biased lineups, "the chances of misidentification rise dramatically.''2 This type of lineup identification may in fact be merely another manifestation of the process of
unconscious transference. 213 A British commentator described the
problem as follows: "The danger arising from photographs is that
when the witness who has identified a suspect from them is asked
to attend a parade, he is 'more likely to have the photograph in
mind than the image he had previously formed of the criminal'... "14Reasons for this tendency on the part of witnesses to
retain at the lineup a clearer image of the photograph than of the
criminal may include the closer time proximity of the lineup to the
photographic display than to the incident and the greater period
of time under far less stressful conditions that the witness had to
study the features of the man pictured in the photograph 21than he
did to study the features of the perpetrator of the crime.
An experiment conducted in 1977 offers support for the contention that the viewing of a photograph of the suspect prior to a
lineup can detract from the reliability of the lineup identification.
In this experiment, a group of subjects was exposed to five
"criminals" for twenty-five seconds each and informed that they
21 6
would be called upon later to identify these five individuals.
That same day the subjects were shown fifteen "mug shots,"
some of which were photographs of the men seen earlier. At a
series of lineups held one week later, the subject-witnesses were
asked whether each lineup participant was one of the original
"criminals." Of the number of innocent lineup participants incorrectly selected as one of the "criminals," more than twice as many
included in the photographic displays were chosen as those whose
photographs were not so included. 1 17 The witnesses had apparently transferred the image of those men viewed in the photographic display back to the original "crime" scene and this resulted in an erroneous lineup identification.
Washington v. Cupp2 18 demonstrates the manner in which
photo-biased lineups are often treated under the totality of circumstances approach to due process identification challenges. On
the same day in which she was sexually attacked in her dormitory,

212. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 150. See also Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony Research: System Variables & Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1546, 1553 (1978).
213. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 151. See notes 140-42 and accompanying text supra.
214. Jaffe, Report of the DepartmentalCommittee on Evidence of Identificationin Criminal Cases, 39 MOD. L. REV. 707, 708 (1976).
215. WALL, supra note 72, at 68.
216. LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 150.

217. Id.
218. 586 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1978).
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a woman was shown photographs of several possible assailants.
Although the defendant's photograph was among them, the victim passed by it without making any sign of recognition. 1 9 The investigating police officer then singled out the picture of the defendant so the victim could see that the photograph contained information concerning the defendant's prior rape conviction. In addition, the officer informed the victim that the man in this photograph was a suspect and had been seen in the area shortly after
the attack.2 20 Upon taking another look at the photograph, the victim said that the defendant was not her assailant. Four days later,
the victim was again unable to identify the defendant from among
171 prints but, later that same day, selected the defendant from a
group of 546 slides. Three months after the photographic arrays,
the victim viewed a lineup from which she chose the defendant as
22
her attacker. 1
The court in Cupp looked to whether the first, admittedly suggestive photo session contaminated the subsequent slide and
lineup identifications. In concluding that it did not, the court
turned to the reliability factors enunciated in Biggers and adopted
in Manson.222 Determining that the victim had seen her assailant
clearly during the attack, had her attention fixed upon him at that
time, described him well to the police, ultimately was certain of
her identification, and that the four-day and three-month intervals
between the crime and the identifications were not unduly long,
the court found this eyewitness testimony to be "highly reliable. 22 1 Included among those reasons offered by the court in
reaching their conclusion was the fact that the witness had not
yielded to police suggestion
when it occurred during the first pho22 4
tographic display.
The facts of this case suggest that the inherent possibility of
unconscious transference resulting from photo-biased lineups was
significantly increased by the overt focusing conduct of the police
officer. 225 Unlike a situation where several images of photographs
displayed to a witness prior to a lineup or photo array may remain
in her mind, here the police, by singling out one photo and transmitting highly incriminating information concerning the individual in that photo, ensured that it would be most unlikely that this
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id.
Id at 136-37.
Id.
Id. at 137. This conclusion was drawn notwithstanding, as the court pointed out, that
the witness admitted on recross examination that she was unable to tell if and to
what degree she was ultimately influenced by the suggestive conduct. The court
attributed no significance to this statement by the witness. Id at 137 n.1.
225. The court seemed to concede that overt focusing occurred by indicating that, had an
identification occurred at the hospital where the first photographic display took
place, its use would constitute a violation of due process. See id. at 137 n.2.
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one face would ever be forgotten. The utilization by the court of
the Biggers reliability factors to overcome this aggravated suggestion is most inappropriate because the victim, possessed of
this supposedly clear and strong impression of her assailant, was
unable to identify the defendant's photograph absent the effects
of suggestion. What occurred in Cupp then was that a victim, who
observed closely and at length the man who attacked her, had her
attention focused emphatically and incriminatingly upon one sus2 26
pect and then specifically denied this suspect was her attacker.
Unless a most persuasive explanation is offered as to why this denial of guilt occurred, reason dictates that any identification of the
same man made subsequent to this post-suggestion denial involves a "substantial likelihood of misidentification" and should
227
be suppressed.

It is noteworthy that the court used the victim's denial of the
defendant's culpability, made after the focusing police conduct, to
demonstrate her ability to resist the suggestive behavior employed here. If, however, she had positively identified the defendant at the first photographic display, the argument undoubtedly
would have been made that this identification was even more
"highly reliable" than the subsequent ones because it possessed
the additional Biggers factors of immediacy and certainty. Moreover, the court failed to realize that the effects of suggestion vary
as to when and how they are manifested.22 The fact that this witness may have been able to fend off the focusing conduct, of which

226. There is no indication that the photograph shown to the victim on the day of the
crime was anything but an accurate likeness of the defendant. It should be noted,
however, that the victim was understandably nervous and had been given a tranquilizer at the hospital where the array was conducted. Id at 137. Despite this nervousness, the victim was able to note, after the suggestive police focusing, that the
high cheekbones of the man in the singled-out photograph did look like those of her
assailant. This attention to detail casts serious doubt on the court's assertion that
"[s]he was thus not in the frame of mind conducive to concentrating on an identification." Id
227. See WALL, supra note 72, at 113. Wall concluded:
Of all the danger signals presently under discussion, surely the most
ominous, the one most clearly indicating that a mistake may have been
made, is that which exists when a witness who identifies the defendant at the
trial is found to have previously failed to identify him.... [Tihe overwhelming majority of those authorities who have considered it have found it to be a
strong indication that the subsequent identification is inaccurate.
Id
228. Over 70 years ago, addressing the effects of suggestion, Hugo Munsterberg wrote:
If a suggestion planted in a consciousness would remain there isolated,
it would be easy to detect it. It would be in such manifold contradiction with
all the normal reminiscences and habitual arguments that every court, for
instance, would quickly recognise the strange thought as an intruder. But
just this is the uncanny power of suggestion, that it once infects all the
neighbouring ideas and emotions and forces the whole mental life of the personality under the unnatural influence.
MUNSTERBERG, supra note 159, at 179-80.
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she was likely aware, in no way demonstrates her ability to be
as
229
resistant to the lingering, unconscious effects of suggestion.
Awareness of these characteristics of suggestion combined
with the effect of unconscious transference and the situation
created for a victim in an emotional state when a figure of authority focuses so prominently on one suspect are all important considerations in determining the reliability of such an identification.
The factors involved in Cupp demonstrate the potential value of
the expert testimony of a psychologist in a court's determination
as to the effects of suggestive conduct upon reliability. Moreover,
it is fundamental to the success of the totality of circumstances
approach that courts gain a fuller realization of the relationship
between suggestion and misidentification.3 °
In Cupp, the witness initially indicated that the man in the
photograph singled out was not her assailant. A different but related problem exists when a witness' first attempt at identification of the suspect is positive and, thereafter, repeated opportunities to view the suspect occur. The purpose of these subsequent
identification proceedings is often to ensure that the witness has
chosen the right man. Invariably, however, regardless of the accuracy of his initial identification, the witness tends to select again
the individual he selected previously.231 Dr. Loftus refers to this
"high degree of persistence in the contents of one's recollections"
as the "freezing effect."232 Reasons offered for this freezing effect
include the pride and stubbornness of witnesses, 33 the human tendency toward self persuasion, 3 4 and the fact that the image of the
individual initially identified remains more vivid than the image of
the criminal.235 Regardless of the reason behind this freezing effect, juries should be made aware of the likelihood that when the
witness on the stand points to the defendant in court as her assail-

229. See People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973). In the appendix to
this decision, the Michigan Supreme Court noted: "The importance of the existence
of so many possible forms of unintentional suggestion lies in the fact that we are
peculiarly susceptible to it and the fact that it is an unconscious process so that we
are unable to detect its influence when it operates." Id. at 216, 205 N.W.2d at 492
(emphasis in original).
230. For other cases where the totality of circumstances has been held to overcome the
effects of a photo-biased lineup, see In re L.W., 390 A.2d 435 (D.C. 1978); Bennett v.
State, 530 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. 1975). For a similar holding with regard to a photobiased photographic array, see State v. Williams, 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 588 (1977).
231. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967). See also United States v. Simmons,
390 U.S. 377, 383-84 (1968); SOBEL, supra note 4, § 3.01 at 10-11 (1972).
232. LoFTus, supra note 74, at 84. See also FRANK & FRANK, supra note 69, at 158.

233. BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 261.
234. Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1115.
235. LoFTus, supra note 74, at 84.
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and not a new sponant, a psychological process of confirmation
236
taneous act of recognition has occurred.
Just as subsequent identifications of the suspect may be no
indication of reliability, so the certainty displayed by the witness
at the initial identification proceeding may be without real value
as a reliability factor. The certainty with which a witness identifies the defendant was cited in Biggers and adopted in Manson as
one factor that tends to demonstrate the reliability of an identifi237
cation procedure notwithstanding the presence of suggestion.
That the witness identifies a suspect with certainty might in reality reveal more about the witness than about the reliability of his
identification. Certainty can be a product of one's careless nature,
tendency toward snap judgments, 238 or the need when making a
decision to make it confidently and assuredly. 239 All of these personal traits, irrelevant to the reliability of the identification, can
account for a witness' certainty in his selection.240
In addition to being a manifestation of a personal trait, certainty may be the product of the suggestive police conduct itself.
In fact, the degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness is
sometimes directly proportional to the degree and success of the
suggestive message brought to bear upon him. 241 It is indeed
ironic that, under the totality of circumstances approach, suggestive practices may not only contribute to the initial identification
made by the witness but may also help save such an identification
236. As one author explains:
When the victim (or other identifying witness) takes the stand and, pointing
to the defendant seated conspicuously at the counsel table, says "that's the
man!" he rarely is saying "that's the man who robbed me several months
ago." In truth, most often he is saying: (1) that's the man whose photo I
identified shortly after the crime; (2) whom later I identified at a lineup; (3)
whom later I identified at the preliminary examination; (4) whom later I identified by "mug shot" before the grand jury; (5) whom later I saw in the courtroom during several adjournments of the trial.
SOBEL, supra note 4, § 3.01 at 10 (1972).
237. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199
(1972).
238. WALL, supra note 72, at 15.
239. LoFTus, supra note 74, at 84.
240. In fact, experiments have shown that a witness who makes an incorrect identification
is no less certain in his selection than is one who chooses correctly. See Wells, supra
note 154, at 286.
241. See, e.g., Sloan v. State, 584 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Noting that certainty is no guarantee of reliability, the Sloan court stated:
It seems very likely that her level of certainty increased because of certain
elements of the procedures alleged to be suggestive .... We do not doubt her
sincere belief in her certainty; such sincere belief, however, is no guarantee
that she was not influenced in subtle ways by suggestive elements in the
identification procedures which took place so long before.
Id at 466-67. See also State v. Commeau, 409 A.2d 247 (Me. 1979), wherein the court
stated that "[tihe fact that Thomas immediately made an identification is not necessarily evidence of reliability; rather it may indicate that he yielded to the suggestivity
of the circumstances." I& at 249.
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from being suppressed. After detailing the arrest and conviction
of the positively, yet misidentified Benjamin Collins, Professor
Borchard concluded, "[T]he positiveness of witnesses is sometimes, as in this case, in inverse ratio to their opportunity for
' '2 2
knowledge or to their reliability. 4
VI. CRITERIA OF SUGGESTION
After the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Biggers, a debate
ensued in the courts and among commentators as to whether the
totality of circumstances test, as defined in Biggers, should be applied to post-Stovall as well as pre-Stovall displays. 2 43 With its
holding in Manson, the Court's unequivocal response was that the
Biggers approach should so apply. Given the Court's explicit rejection of the per se approach, attempts to protect defendants
from the use of suggestive identification testimony of dubious reliability may better be directed to improving the meaning and application of the totality test. Specifically, the societal interests of
deterrence of improper police procedures, furtherance of the administration of justice, and the avoidance of the use of unreliable
identification testimony can provide the basis for expanding the
criteria employed in determining the admissibility of identification evidence.
While five specific factors for evaluating reliability were provided by the Supreme Court, the Court failed to provide guidelines
for determining what conduct is suggestive and what forms of
suggestion are worse than others. As a result, many courts have
come to regard suggestion as a monolithic concept devoid of
gradations or merely as a prerequisite to be met prior to analyzing
the Biggers reliability factors. 244 In adding to the reliability determination outlined in Biggers, the Supreme Court in Manson specifically required that the negative influence of suggestion must
be weighed against these reliability factors. 24 5 In order to perform
this weighing task adequately, factors that create and aggravate
suggestion as well as those factors indicative of reliability must be
considered. Clearly, some identification procedures are worse than

242. BORCHARD, supra note 67, at 50.
243. See, e.g., cases cited in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1977). See generally Eisenberg & Feustel, supra note 73; Grano, supra note 82; Pulaski, supra note
17; Note, Mandatory Exclusion of Identifications Resulting from Suggestive Confrontations:A ConceptualAlternative to the Independent Basis Test 53 B.U. L. REV.
433 (1973).
244. See, e.g., Landry v. Alabama, 579 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Washington, 257
N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 1008 (1978); State v. Lee, 340 So. 2d
1339 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 941 (1977); State v. Montgomery, 588 S.W.2d
80 (Mo. 1979); In re Mark J., 92 Misc. 2d 733, 412 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose, 265 Pa. Super. Ct. 159, 401 A.2d 1148 (1979).
245. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
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others and more conducive to misidentifications. The Supreme
Court can provide police departments and lower courts with
guidance by indicating what types of suggestive conduct are more
likely to result in unreliable identification testimony. 246 As to
these extreme forms of suggestive procedures, a higher degree of
reliability need be shown than that necessary to247overcome nominal or less severe types of suggestive practices.
In stating explicitly some of those types of suggestive police
practices which will result in suppression of testimony, absent factors showing an extremely reliable identification, the Supreme
Court would be injecting a degree of meaningful deterrence into

the totality of circumstances test.24 Further, with the likely in-

crease in the exclusion of evidence stemming from grossly suggestive identification practices, there would then be some impetus for
police departments and legislatures to promulgate rules for the
proper conduct of identification confrontations. Moreover, although judicial uniformity in application of a due process standard is impossible, and each case would still be determined on its
own unique factual situation, a step would be taken towards a

246. Most commentators who specify types of suggestive behavior to be avoided do so
within the context of rules that should be followed when an identification proceeding
is conducted. As a result, many worthwhile suggestions (e.g., prosecutors, not policemen, should conduct the displays, other display participants should bear a reasonably close resemblance to the suspect, a minimum of five look-alikes should be included, the display should be preserved by videotaping, and a blank lineup should be
employed where appropriate) are not offered, nor could they be, as due process
minima but are offered instead as a means of achieving the fairest possible identifications. See, e.g., SOBEL, supra note 4, §§ 55-57 (1972); WALL, supra note 72, at 26-65;
Eisenberg & Feustel, supra note 73, at 680-81. See also WALL, supra note 72, at
26-89.
247. Forms of extreme suggestion that would require a higher degree of reliability to
avoid suppression might include informing a witness that the suspect has confessed
or was apprehended while in possession of the fruits of the crime, displaying a group
of suspects together, having more than one witness view a display at the same time,
and presenting the suspect with a distinguishing trait or item also possessed by the
perpetrator. No list of aggravating factors can be all-inclusive, but specifying a number of forms of suggestion that are extreme not only reduces the likelihood that these
techniques will be upheld by the courts and utilized by the police but also puts these
institutions on notice that there is a legal consequence to the degree of suggestion
employed. This consequence could result not only from these specifically designated
aggravating factors but from other severely focusing behavior or from a combination
of techniques not grossly suggestive when used individually. This consequence,
however, does not automatically involve the "Draconian sanction" of reversal in
cases where reliable but suggestive identification evidence is admitted by the trial
court. In fact, suppression would be tied directly to reliability as desired by the
Supreme Court, but the concept of reliability would gain a new and more scientifically
accurate meaning.
248. See Grano, supra note 82, at 786.
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more consistent interpretation of what constitutes suggestion and
249
to what degree certain suggestive practices diminish reliability.
This promulgation of rules for identification procedures and the
more uniform application of the totality test, when combined with
the reasonably anticipated decrease in grossly suggestive identification procedures, should serve to further the administration of
justice.
The particular societal interest that would be most directly affected by the Supreme Court's articulation of degrees of suggestion is preventing the jury from hearing unreliable evidence. Without guidelines as to types and gradations of suggestion, courts
have quite often failed to appreciate the impact of specific forms
of focusing behavior upon the reliability of an identification. One
commentator, referring to the present totality of circumstances
approach, has observed: "The problem with this approach is that
even people who have had a good opportunity to view a crime may
be open to suggestiveness. ' '25 0 In theory, the weighing process required by the Court in Manson provides for the suppression of
identification testimony derived from highly suggestive circumstances notwithstanding the presence of some reliability. 251 In
practice, however, courts have been most reluctant to preclude the
admission of evidence
deemed reliable under the standards enun252

ciated in Biggers.

The designation of certain highly suggestive practices,
together with the evidentiary requirement of an especially strict
standard of reliability to sustain the admission of identifications
derived from such procedures should diminish measurably the
chances of unreliable evidence being used to convict a defendant.
Additionally, the act of articulation itself calls attention to and
emphasizes the close and complex relationship between suggestion and misidentification. Still, unlike the per se approach specifically rejected by the Supreme Court, it would be the effect of the
suggestive procedure upon the reliability of an identification and

249. See Eisenberg & Feustel, supra note 73, at 680. As these authors stated: "If the case
by case approach is going to be used, it should be accompanied by adequate criteria
so that the lower courts will have some guidance in the application of constitutional
standards in eyewitness confrontation cases." Id.
250. Id. In certain situations, witnesses have even misidentified their own friends and
relatives. WALL, supra note 72, at 13.

251. Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Manson:
The Court holds, as Neil v.Biggers failed to, that a due process identification
inquiry must take account of the suggestiveness of a confrontation and the
likelihood that it led to misidentification, as recognized in Stovall and Wade.
Thus, even if a witness did have an otherwise adequate opportunity to view a
criminal, the later use of a highly suggestive identification procedure can
render his testimony inadmissible.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 129 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. See SOBEL, supra note 4, § 37 at 60-63; id. §§ 38-40.
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not the procedure itself that would ultimately determine the outcome of a due process challenge.
VII. EXPERT PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY
In addition to articulating those police procedures which are
especially suggestive and conducive to misidentifications, the
Supreme Court can take another step towards improving the application of the totality of circumstances test. In the federal
courts and in those states which require a hearing out of the jury's
presence to determine whether eyewitness identification evidence
is violative of due process,253 the Court should encourage the use
of expert witnesses to explain the impact of certain suggestive
procedures upon reliability. Judges required to conduct the weighing process mandated by Manson could do so more meaningfully
with the benefit of information supplied by a perceptual psychologist as to the manner in which specific types of focusing can produce misidentification. The psychologist's testimony concerning
the effects of suggestion could be given without the expert's having to examine the eyewitness himself or to offer a conclusion as to
whether the identification testimony should be suppressed.2 5 4
Expert testimony is generally admissible if it will assist the
trier of fact in making an "intelligent evaluation of facts."2 55 The
trial judge possesses broad discretion in determining the admissibility of such testimony, and the exercise of that discretion will
not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. 256
Appellate courts have consistently upheld the exclusion from
trial of expert testimony regarding the fallibility of eyewitness

253. See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981) (states are not required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to hold such hearings out of the presence of
the jury).
254. See LOFTUS, supra note 74, at 196.
255. FED. R. EVID. 702, Advisory Committee's Notes. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
256. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
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identification. 57 However, no reported case has addressed the admissibility of such evidence at a pretrial Wade-type hearing to
suppress an identification. An examination of the rules concerning
the admissibility of expert testimony reveals that experts on eyewitness identification should be permitted to testify at this type
of hearing.
Generally, the admissibility of expert testimony is determined
by the following criteria: (1) whether the witness is a qualified expert; (2) whether the testimony concerns the proper subject matter (i.e., will it assist the trier of fact); and (3) whether the testimony conforms to a generally accepted explanatory theory.2 58 The
admissibility of expert testimony is further subject to the general
probative value must not be outweighed by
qualification that its259
its prejudicial effect.
A. Qualified Expert

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness may qualify
as an expert by reason of specialized knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.2

60

It has been suggested that the most qual-

ified expert on eyewitness identifications would be one who has
done actual research in memory and perception and has a
thorough understanding of the factors influencing the accuracy of
eyewitness reports.2 61 At minimum, the proposed expert should

hold an advanced degree in psychology and should be knowledgeable in the specific area of eyewitness identification.

257. The majority of these cases did not involve allegations that the identification was the
result of an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confrontation. Consequently, the
expert's testimony would have related primarily to the reliability factors set forth in
Biggers. E.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (lst Cir. 1979); United States v.
Watson, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395
F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407, 36 S.W.2d 400 (1931);
People v. Brooks, 51 Cal. App. 3d 602, 124 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1975); People v. Guzman,
47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017 (Fla.
1978); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 208 S.E.2d 850 (1974); State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519,
601 P.2d 1125 (1979); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 6 Mass. App. 492,378 N.E.2d 451
(1978); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 576 P.2d 275 (1978); People v. Valentine, 53
A.D.2d 832, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1976); State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1979).
Contra, People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974); Dyas v.
United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977). By comparison, in a Wade hearing, the
expert testimony would also concern the suggestive factors surrounding the identification and the impact those factors have on the reliability factors.
258. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973); see United States v.
Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 31 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
259. FED. R. EvID. 402; see United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
260. FED. R. EvID. 702.
261. Wilson, Psychological Opinions on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 14
JUDGE'S J. 72, 73 (1970).
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ProperSubject Matter

The second requirement for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony is that such testimony must be in regard to a
proper subject matter. Many courts have used this requirement to
justify the exclusion of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness reports. The courts have generally stated either that the
subject of the eyewitness expert's testimony is not beyond the
common experience of a layman2 62 or that the expert, by testifying
to the accuracy of the witness' identification, would invade the
province of the jury. 2 3 In excluding expert testimony, a few
courts have also relied upon the fact that the testimony would not
specifically address the perceptual capacity of a particular witness 264 and would, therefore, not assist the trier of fact in its ultimate determination.
1.

Beyond the Common Experience of a Layman

The common law rule requires that the subject matter of the
testimony must be beyond lay comprehension before an expert
may be employed. 265 This requirement, however, was modified by
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 does not require that a
layman have no ability to evaluate the evidence but merely that
the expert testimony be helpful to a complete and competent understanding of the facts. 266 One commentator has referred to the
test of admissibility as "a common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and
to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the sub26 7
ject involved in the dispute.
262. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Fosher, 449 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978), affd, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979);
Criglow v. State, 183 Ark. 407,409, 36 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1931); Dyas v. United States,
376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C. 1977); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. 1978);
State v. Reed, 226 Kan. 519, 522, 601 P.2d 1125, 1128 (1979); Commonwealth v.
Jones, 362 Mass. 497, 501, 287 N.E.2d 599, 602 (1972); People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d
832, 833, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (1976); State v. Parrow, 404 A.2d 465,471 (R.I. 1979).
263. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom.United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); People v. Brooks, 51 Cal. App. 3d
602, 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495 (1975); People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380,
385-86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1975); People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 834, 837 (1974); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 764, 208 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (1974);
People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 833, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (1976).
264. Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 148, 576 P.2d 275, 278 (1978). See also United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
265. Cramer v. Clark Memorial Hosp., 45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427,428-29 (1970);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 29 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
266. FED. R. EvID. 702; Wilson, Psychological Opinions on the Accuracy of Eyewitness
Testimony, 14 JUDGE'S J. 72, 72 (1970); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert
Psychological Testimony on the Unreliabilityof Eyewitness Identification,29 STAN.
L. REV. 969, 1016 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Eyewitness Identification].
267. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952) (emphasis added).
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Manson requires judges to evaluate the impact that suggestive police procedures have upon the reliability of an identification. Admittedly, judges may have some common sense understanding of what practices are suggestive and the Supreme Court
has indicated that cross-examination is the tool to reveal the
nature of these suggestive practices in court. 68 The assertion that
cross-examination is the appropriate vehicle for eliciting the impact of suggestive identification techniques has never been shown
to have any factual basis, however, 6 9 and in fact most psychologists and some judges argue the reverse is true.270 One reason that
cross-examination fails to demonstrate the possibility of an unreliable identification is that the sincerity and certainty displayed by
the witness while testifying are usually genuine and therefore impressive to the trier of fact. 271 Adversarial questions, no matter
how skillfully put, are unlikely to dent this impression. 272 Moreover, attempts to show that the witness' testimony, while given
honestly, is nonetheless inaccurate are also likely to prove futile.
In the words of one author:
It is assumed that cross-examination will bring out
truth and unveil false or inaccurate testimony. While it is
true that a witness can be challenged on the accuracy of
his observation, the point here made is not that the observation of the individual witness may be at fault but that
268. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1981); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
113 n.14, 116 (1977).
269. In referring to eyewitness testimony, psychologist L. Craig Parker wrote: "It
appears that too often the courts view the adversarialsystem as an adequate safeguard when in fact there is little empiricalevidence to support their views. In general,
the scientific community's disagreements with the Courts appear to be very strong
on this issue." C. PARKER, LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 105-06 (1980) (emphasis in original).
270. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235 (1967). In Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341
(1981), Justice Brennan, in his dissent, commented on the effectiveness of crossexamination in this regard:
Cross-examination, of course, affects the weight and credibility given by the
jury to evidence, but cross-examination is both an ineffective and a wrong
tool for purging inadmissible identification evidence from the jurors' minds.
It is an ineffective tool because all of the scientific evidence suggests that
much eyewitness identification testimony has an unduly powerful effect on
jurors. Thus, the jury is likely to give the erroneously admitted evidence
substantial weight, however skillful the cross-examination.
Id at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Dr. Parker disagrees even with the assertion that, at least when counsel is present at the identification display, cross-examination can ultimately serve as an adequate safeguard against unreliable identifications: "There are so many conditions
under which distortion and bias may interfere with accurate eyewitness identification, that cross-examination, with or without counsel's presence at the moment of
identification, is hardly sufficient to insure the integrity of the process." C. PARKER,
LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 106-07 (1980).
271. See notes 237-42 and accompanying text supra.
272. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 82, at 747. As this author explained: "The danger arises
not because the witness chooses to lie, but rather because the witness sincerely
believes that the new image portrays the actual offender. Therefore, if the witness
has erred, cross-examination will frequently fail to reveal it." Id.
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is faulty in
on the whole the observation of all2 7witnesses
3
some degree or in some situations.
When an unreliable identification is attributable to the effects
of suggestion upon the human thought process, cross-examination is a particularly inappropriate means of exposing the error.274
Witnesses are frequently unaware of the existence of suggestion
when they make an identification and are thus nearly incapable of
being cross-examined as to the influence of these suggestive elements.2 75 The police themselves are likely to be unaware of the fact
that they are communicating to the witness their own preconceptions of who committed the crime. 276 This lack of awareness on the
part of the police is especially acute when the individual officer's
preconception stems from his own past experiences and expectations. 277 Cross-examination is still less likely to be of any real value
the method of communicain revealing suggestive conduct when
278
tion of the suggestion is non-verbal.
In performing the balancing procedure mandated by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the totality of circumstances
test, the trial judge must be aware of the precise effect that police
focusing has upon the reliability of an identification. The fact that
many popular opinions concerning the reliability of identifications
have been disproved by psychological experiments indicates that
this assessment as to the impact of suggestion is beyond the
awareness of the average layman or judge. The impact of factors
such as stress, certainty, weapon focus, unconscious transference,
identifying several suspects at once, and the role of distinguishing
characteristics is often quite different in substance and degree
than common knowledge dictates. Thus, it is evident that laymen
do not possess "the best possible knowledge of organic and be-

havioral mechanisms of perception.'

'279

273. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 35.
274. See Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Perception, 82 DICK. L. REV. 465,
480-81 (1978); Eyewitness Identification, supra note 266, at 994-95.
275. YARMEY, supra note 96, at 155; Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1114; Eyewitness
Identification,supra note 266, at 994.
276. Levine & Tapp, supra note 106, at 1114. Even trained researchers are often unaware
of the information they unconsciously communicate. Professor Robert Rosenthal
informed his class that they were about to do research designed to test the ability of
genetically bred intelligent rats to solve a maze when compared to genetically bred
dull rats. The students assigned to work with the bright rats reported their ability to
learn the maze in significantly less time than it took the dull rats. The fact that in
reality all of the rats were chosen totally at random led Rosenthal to conclude that
the expectations of the testers were passed unconsciously and obviously non-verbally
to the rats. Fanselow, How to Bias an Eyewitness, Soc. ACT.& L., May 1975, at 3, 3.
277. MARSHALL, supra note 95, at 51-52.
278. For examples of the methods and impact of non-verbal cues at eyewitness identification proceedings, see Fanselow, How to Bias an Eyewitness, Soc. ACT. & L., May
1975, at 3, 3-4.
279. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1979). The Foshercourt, however, ruled
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in excluding the testimony
because the offer of proof did not sufficiently focus on the particular issue involved in
the case. Id, at 382-83.
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An expert on eyewitness identifications could provide the
judge with scientific data obtained through psychological experiments. Scientific evidence that bears on the reliability of an identification, in light of the suggestive factors present, would assist
the judge in weighing the impact of those factors in a knowledgeable, informed manner.
2.

Invading the Province of the Jury

Several courts have concluded that expert testimony is inadmissible because it would take over the jury's task of determining
the weight and credibility of the witness' testimony. s0 According
to these courts, the credibility of a witness is an ultimate issue be28
fore the jury, upon which an expert may not express an opinion. 1
In a pretrial Wade hearing concerning a due process challenge, the analogous argument exists that the expert's testimony
embraces the ultimate issues to be determined by and thereby invades the province of the judge. The ultimate issue rule, however,
has been the subject of much criticism 28 2 and has been specifically
abolished by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 3 The majority of
states have also abandoned the rule. 28 Thus, in most cases,
whether the expert's testimony goes to an ultimate issue is not a
relevant consideration.
Even in those jurisdictions which have retained the ultimate
issue rule, the suggested use of expert testimony would not be objectionable as an invasion of the province of the judge. The
expert's testimony would be limited to an enumeration and expla-

280. United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); People v. Brooks, 51 Cal. App. 3d
602, 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495 (1975); People v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380,
385-86, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1975); People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 834, 837 (1974); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 764, 208 S.E.2d 850, 852-53 (1974);
People v. Valentine, 53 A.D.2d 832, 833, 385 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (1976).
281. E.g., Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 764, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1974).
282. E.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 12 (E. Cleary ed. 1972);
WALL, supra note 72, at 213; J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1921 (J. Chadborn ed. 1978); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 423-24
(1952).
283. See FED. R. EVID. 704.
284. E.g., Crawford Coal Co. v. Stephens, 382 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 1980); Crump v. Universal
Safety Equip. Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 202, 398 N.E.2d 188 (1979); Davis v. Schneider, 395
N.E.2d 283 (Ind. 1979); Stanks v. A.F.E. Indus., Inc., 403 N.E.2d 849 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980); Grismore v. Consolidated Prods. Co., 5 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1942); In re Gatson,
3 Kan. 2d 265, 593 P.2d 423 (1979); Commonwealth Dep't of Highways v. Widner, 388
S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1965); Dudek v. Popp, 373 Mich. 300, 129 N.W.2d 393 (1964); Deskin
v. Brewer, 590 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1979); Southern Pac. Co. v. Watkins, 83 Nev. 471, 435
P.2d 498 (1968); McKay Mach. Co. v. Rodman, 11 Ohio St. 2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 304
(1967); Welch v. United States Bancorp Realty & Mortgage Trust, 286 Or. 673, 596
P.2d 947 (1979); Groce v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 252 Or. 296, 488 P.2d 554 (1968); Redman v. Ford Motor Co., 253 S.C. 266, 170 S.E.2d 207 (1969); Edwards v. Didericksen,
597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979); Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis. 2d 111, 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969).
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nation of the various factors involved in the case in issue that generally influence an identification. The expert would not be expressing an opinion on the accuracy of a particular witness' identification and would, therefore, not be invading the province of the
judge.285 The judge, with the assistance of the expert's testimony,
would make the ultimate determination of whether the corrupting
influence of suggestion would outweigh the reliability of the identification.
3.

Perceptual Capacity of a Particular Witness

A few courts have suggested that expert testimony that addresses only the powers of observation and recollection of the
average person and does not address those powers as they relate
to a particular witness is not relevant and, therefore, not admissible.28 6 There is no evidentiary principle, however, that makes it improper "to develop general testimony in an area of expert knowledge, and rely upon other evidence to relate such testimony to the
case. '28 7 Generally, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to
prove a material fact. 28 8 If the testimony of an expert addresses
the effect certain suggestive factors may have on the accuracy of
an identification, and those suggestive factors are present in a
particular case, the testimony is directly relevant to the reliability
of the9 challenged identification and should therefore be admissible. 28
C.

Conformity to a Generally Accepted Explanatory Theory

The third requirement for the admissibility of expert testimony is that it be in accordance with a generally accepted explanatory theory. 290 Through years of extensive research, experimental psychologists have developed a comprehensive body of knowledge regarding eyewitness perception and memory. The vast
amount of material published in this field suggests its acceptance
by the scientific community. Several trial courts have also implicitly recognized the validity of expert testimony on eyewitness
identifications.2 11 Moreover, there are no reported cases in which

285. See Eyewitness Identification, supra note 266, at 1020-21.
286. Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 147-48, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978). See also United
States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
287. Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 151, 576 P.2d 275, 280 (1979) (Gunderson, J.,
concurring).
288. FED. R. EVID. 401; see, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
1973.
289. See FED. R. EVID. 402.

290. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
291. See Eyewitness Identification, supra note 266, at 1006 n.173.
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expert testimony of this type has been excluded solely on the
ground that it is outside a recognized field of expertise. 92 It appears, therefore, that expert testimony on eyewitness identifications falls within a field of expertise that is generally recognized
by both the scientific and the legal communities.
D.

Probative Value vs. PrejudicialEffect

Even if the criteria for admitting expert testimony are satisfied, the testimony may still be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues or misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumula293
tive evidence.
The primary danger presented by allowing experts to testify
in regard to eyewitness identifications is that of undue prejudice.
Courts often fear that an eyewitness expert's impressive credentials may lead the jury to rely too heavily on his opinion and undervalue the weight of the eyewitness' testimony. 294 The significance of these fears, however, is greatly diminished when the expert testimony is offered at a pretrial Wade hearing, which is before a judge, not a jury. Courts have long recognized the distinction between the application of the prejudice rule to a trial before a
jury and its application to a trial before a judge. 295 A judge, due to

292. Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 150, 567 P.2d 275, 280 (1978) (Gunderson, J.,
concurring). The majority of the court, however, held, inter alia, that the offer of
proof was inadequate here because it failed to establish that the testimony was
within a recognized field of expertise. Id. at 147, 567 P.2d at 278. See also United
States v. Jackson, Cr. No. 16158-74 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1975), wherein the trial
judge ruled that the subfield of eyewitness identification within the fields of perception and memory had not reached a state of general acceptability.
293. FED. R. EVID. 402; accord, CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-445 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-403 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.03
(West 1975); see, e.g., Delacy v. Manson City, 240 Iowa 951,954-55, 38 N.W. 587,589
(1949); Brener v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 160 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo. 1942); State v.
Freeman, 232 Or. 267, 273-74, 374 P.2d 453, 456 (1962).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Fosher, 449 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Mass. 1978), affd, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 636 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Porter v. State, 94
Nev. 142, 148, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978).
295. See, e.g., People v. McNeal, 56 II. App. 132, 138, 371 N.E.2d 926, 931 (1977); State v.
Garvi, 3 Or. App. 391, 394, 474 P.2d 363, 364 (1970). See also Trovinger v. State, 34
Md. App. 357, 363, 367 A.2d 548, 552 (1977); Nevil v. Wahl, 228 Mo. 49, 65 S.W.2d
123 (1933); State v. Price, 17 Wash. App. 247, 250-51, 562 P.2d 256, 258 (1977).
In Matson v. Matson, 226 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1975), the court held that, when an
action is tried without a jury, all evidence that is not clearly inadmissible should be
admitted. Id. at 665. See also Lappin v. Lappin, 18 Ariz. App. 444, 503 P.2d 402
(1972).
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his professional training and judicial temperament, would not
have the fallibility of a juror.2 96 Judges often deal with experts and
are less likely to be overwhelmed by the experts' impressive credentials. 297 Furthermore, their professional experience in evaluating all types of evidence reduces the likelihood that judges will
give undue weight to the testimony. 298 Consequently, any possibility that the expert testimony will be misleading is significantly reduced when the testimony is presented at a pretrial Wade hearing.
As a result, the probative value will not be outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
E.

Considerationsof JudicialEconomy

Expert testimony may also be excluded if its admissibility
would result in an undue consumption of time.2 99 If experts were
permitted to testify on the general fallibilities of human perception, every case involving an eyewitness identification would warrant the use of an expert. Under such circumstances, undue delays
become a legitimate concern. However, the number of cases warranting the use of expert testimony would be significantly less if
the use of experts was limited to Wade hearings. 30 0 If need be, the
use of experts could further be limited to those cases in which
guilt is established exclusively by identification testimony. Considering the highly persuasive impact of eyewitness testimony
and the grave consequences of mistaken identifications, 30 1 the few
hours consumed by expert testimony should be a minor concern in
determining its admissibility.
An expert, qualified in the area of perception and memory,
could assist the judge at a Wade hearing in weighing the corrupting effect of a suggestive identification against its reliability. The
expert's testimony would also be in accordance with a generally
accepted explanatory theory. Because the hearing is before a
296. See State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 271 A.2d 641 (1970), in which the court stated:
[Jiudges, being flesh and blood, are subjected to the same emotions and
human frailties as affect other members of the species; however, by his legal
training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state of the art of
his profession, he must early learn to perceive, distinguish and interpret the
nuances of the law which are its "warn & woof."
Id. at 233, 271 A.2d at 644.
297. Id.
298. See Nevil v. Wahl, 228 Mo. 49, 65 S.W.2d 123 (1933); Laumeier v. Gehner, 19 S.W. 82,
82 (Mo. 1892).
299. FED. R. EvID. 402; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146, 150 (9th Cir. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
300. This is not to suggest that the use of an expert on eyewitness identifications at trial
would not be most helpful to the jury in determining the likelihood that the identification is accurate. Limiting, at least initially, the use of the expert to pretrial hearings
examining the impact of suggestiveness upon the reliability of an identification, however, would avoid the prejudicial effect on juries that some judges seem to fear.
301. WALL, supra note 72, at 19-23.
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judge, not a jury, the probative value of the testimony would not
be outweighed by any prejudicial effect. Consequently, the testimony satisfies the prerequisites of admissibility, and no logical
justification exists for its exclusion.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Manson v. Brathwaite, °2 the Supreme Court articulated
three societal interests that should be served by any approach utilized to determine the admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony challenged as a violation of due process. Deterring suggestive police procedures, furthering the administration of justice,
and avoiding the submission of unreliable identification evidence
to the jury were all rightfully cited by the Court as significant due
process concerns. Unfortunately, the totality of circumstances
test as adopted by the Supreme Court in Manson and applied by
lower federal and state courts has satisfied none of these interests.
Rather than being deterred, the police have been afforded
vast discretion in their choice of methods to procure identifications. Since no procedure, regardless of its flagrantly suggestive
nature, is held out as particularly likely to result in suppression,
and reliability factors outside the control of the police are often determinative in the decision to admit eyewitness testimony, the
police are without incentive to employ the fairest identification
procedures possible under the circumstances.
The Court's failure to define factors of suggestivity has resulted in inconsistent and often questionable judicial decisions as
to whether certain police practices are suggestive and, if suggestive, whether the impropriety is overcome by indicia of reliability.
As the use of this questionable identification testimony at trial
has a significant impact upon a jury and as it goes directly to the
truth-finding process, the totality approach has done little to prevent wrongful convictions. With neither guidelines nor incentive,
legislatures and police departments are not likely to promulgate
rules to ensure the fairest possible identification procedures. In
short, the totality approach as now applied has been notably unsuccessful in furthering the administration of justice.
Where the totality approach as applied by federal and state
courts has failed most clearly is in its lack of awareness of the impact of suggestive police practices upon the reliability of an identification. Until the courts comprehend fully this impact, juries will
continue to hear testimony given with certainty and honesty but
possessing that degree of unreliability against which due process
is designed to protect.

302. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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Suggestive Identifications

The articulation of specified types of extreme suggestion to be
avoided and the requirement that identifications obtained after
the use of such techniques require the highest degree of reliability
to be admissible would serve several purposes. First, police officers would be deterred from utilizing these grossly suggestive but
not uncommon procedures for fear of the explicitly increased likelihood of the exclusion of such identification testimony. Second,
courts would have some guidance as to what procedures are suggestive and which are particularly likely to lead to misidentification and, therefore, would less often be in the position of condoning admittedly improper conduct that contaminates the truthfinding process.
The use of expert witnesses in the area of eyewitness identifications is another means by which the application of the totality
of circumstances test can be improved. In explaining the different, often subtle, ways suggestion is communicated and the impact of specific focusing conduct upon the reliability of an identification, a psychologist can provide help in answering the very
question judges are called upon to determine at pretrial identification hearings.
The expansion of the due process approach herein offered
maintains the framework of the totality of circumstances approach and its use of reliability as the touchstone upon which eyewitness identification evidence is admitted. Where these proposals differ from the current approach is that, unlike the latter,
the proposals offered herein begin to address the societal interests
behind due process articulated in Manson.

